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This dissertation is composed of three independent investigations within the subject 
of higher education policy. Chapter 1 introduces the investigations and provides a 
description of the authors personal involvement in the policies analyzed. Chapter 2 presents 
the first investigation, a case study of higher education finance policymaking in Texas from 
1995 to 2013. This study used the Advocacy Coalitions Framework and the cognitive 
linguistic theory of moral politics to identify three advocacy coalitions that competed with 
each other to affect higher education finance policy. Using a mixed-methods approach, this 
study identified the policy belief systems of the Egalitarian Coalition, the Free-Market 
Coalition, and the University Coalition. Through a history of policy changes, this study 
analyzed the effect of state government moving from bipartisan to one-party Republican 
leadership. The next two chapters then evaluated two major policy changes that occurred 
during this policy history. Chapter 3 presents a regression discontinuity analysis that 
estimated the causal relationship between a state grant program for low-income students 
and a series of educational and workforce outcomes that define a student's journey through 
college, the early years of their adult work life, and graduate degree attainment. This study 
found that grant aid improved persistence and bachelor’s degree completion, reduced 
student debt, and increased the likelihood of graduate degree attainment. Grant effects on 
early career earnings were positive, but not statistically significant. Chapter 4 presents a 
 vi 
study of dual credit as a school-district policy. This investigation estimated the effects of 
dual credit on outcomes that trace a student’s journey from high school to undergraduate 
and graduate degree completion. Dual credit was a school district policy that allowed high 
school students to enroll in college-level coursework and simultaneously earn high school 
and college credit. This study also investigated the potential for improving the design of 
dual-credit programs by exploring heterogeneous effects by program attributes. Using 
panel data with school district fixed effects, this investigation found that increases in the 
share of students earning dual credit were associated with increased high school 
graduation; increased university application, admission, and enrollment; shortened time to 
degree completion; and increased associate, bachelor’s, and graduate degree attainment. 
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with a discussion of the policy implications of the 
findings. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This dissertation represents the capstone of my graduate studies. It also draws on 
my fifteen years of public service as a member of the Texas House of Representatives, 
representing a central city district within the City of San Antonio. My studies at the LBJ 
School have been a luxury and at times a burden for this forty-something adult with family 
responsibilities and a full-time job. For the most part, however, the Ph.D. program has been 
a precious opportunity to slow down, sharpen old skills and gain new ones, and most 
importantly reflect on my work in politics and public policy.  
As a Democrat, I spent all but one session of my legislative career as a member of 
the minority party. Unfortunately, the session Democrats were in the majority was during 
my freshman session. It turns out that it’s never a good time to be a freshman. But, these 
experiences taught me valuable lessons in how to be effective when you are at the bottom 
of a power structure. 
During my tenure, my Republican colleagues advanced an ambitious agenda to 
change the state’s approach to higher education finance. Recognizing I could not change 
their major policy goals, I did my best to plant good seeds within bills that challenged my 
core values. I was most effective at doing this because I tried to specialize (with great help 
from my staff) on the subjects I cared most about. I also dedicated significant time 
cultivating relationships with my elected colleagues and other stakeholders committed to 
solving the same public challenges in education, though from different perspectives. 
My proudest moments occurred when I won policy victories, no matter their size, 
by being principled and strategic. One example of this took place during the legislative 
session of 2009. In the previous three sessions, representatives of the University of Texas 
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at Austin (UT) came to the capitol with a request to eliminate or dramatically cut back the 
“Top 10 Rule,” a state law that granted automatic college admission to students who 
graduated in the top 10 percent of their graduating high school class. This policy was 
created as a race-neutral way of providing academically accomplished high school 
graduates an equal chance at gaining entrance into our state’s most selective colleges. They 
failed to amend this law in each of the three prior sessions. But 2009 was shaping up to be 
a different session for many reasons. 
In 2009, UT once again led the charge to amend the Top 10 Rule. As the university 
in Texas receiving the most applications, they were most affected by the Top 10 Rule. 
Within a few years, the policy would have produced the unintended effect of requiring UT 
to expand their freshman class. During this session, they built significant support with 
Republicans and succeeded in passing a bill out of the Senate (SB175-81)1 that would have 
capped the effect of the Top 10 Rule by having it apply only to 60 percent of a university’s 
entering class. Though the bill arrived in the House late in the session, it appeared that 2009 
would be the session they amended the law. 
One of the reasons why 2009 was a unique year was that Democrats had won 
another three seats in the Texas House, putting us on the verge of having equal 
representation with Republicans, 74 to 76. We used our new-found political strength to 
replace the sitting Speaker of the House with a Republican House member whom we 
considered more bipartisan.  
I supported keeping the Top 10 Rule unchanged. However, I recognized that the 
case for amending the law was becoming increasingly compelling and that 2009 might be 
the best opportunity to negotiate changes from a position of strength. Though Democrats 
                                               
1 This study identifies Texas state legislation with the bill number, followed by a dash, and ending with the 
year of the legislative session. 
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were not united, I stepped forward and represented a part of my caucus in renegotiating the 
law with UT’s president, Bill Powers, UT’s chancellor, Francisco Cigarroa, and 
Representative Dan Branch, R-Dallas. In the end, we brokered an agreement to raise the 
cap in the Senate bill to 75 percent and included stronger reporting and oversight over UT’s 
commitment to improve student diversity. An important part of our deal was a handshake 
agreement that UT would not return to the capitol in the near future to renegotiate the deal. 
In the end, the four of us were able to sell the agreement to our different constituencies. 
SB175 became law and remains the law today.  
Had I and other Democrats decided to not negotiate, I believe fewer students from 
historically underrepresented communities would have been granted admission to their 
dream school as soon after this session Democrats significant representation in the House 
of Representatives. Also gained from this experience were trust and goodwill, making the 
next round of debates and negotiations more productive. 
This history of policymaking brought me to this study. My concern for our state, 
its’s institutions of higher education, their mission to serve and transform our people and 
communities, and my concern for helping disadvantaged students influenced the subjects 
selected for study. Most of all, my commitment to the idea that rigorous analysis and 
informed debate can and must advance our public policies helped me complete this multi-
year study. Finally, in writing this dissertation, my hope was that current and future 
policymakers would learn from this work and build on our past successes and challenges. 
In Chapter 1, I attempted to uncover the history of higher education finance 
policymaking from 1995 to 2013 with a focus on the ideas and beliefs of this period, rather 
than focusing on individuals. To accomplish this, I used the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) as an analytic lens to bring to the foreground the policy beliefs and deep 
core values that organized policy actors into like-minded coalitions and motivated their 
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actions. This was the first case study of state higher education policy that reviewed nearly 
two decades of data to surface deeper insights into the policy beliefs and strategic behavior 
of advocacy coalitions. My motivation for better understanding these coalitions was to help 
future policy actors of higher education policy navigate their differences and have more 
productive policy debates.  
In Chapter 3, I took advantage of a natural experiment to estimate the impact of 
TEXAS Grants, a state-funded need- and merit-based student grant program. Using a 
regression discontinuity research design, this study represented the first rigorous evaluation 
of grant aid in the country’s second-largest state, which educates 10 percent of the nation’s 
children. Texas’s size and diversity provided a population that allowed for the estimation 
of more precise and externally valid results.  
Student outcomes investigated included employment rates and earnings while in 
college, persistence rates, university course enrollment, and bachelor’s degree completion. 
It also examined how state-funded grant aid supplants other types of financial aid awarded 
and its effect long-term outcomes. The long-term effects of TEXAS Grants analyzed 
included estimating effects on employment rates, annual earnings, and graduate degree 
completion up to 10 years post college entry. Overall, the findings expanded our 
understanding of the benefits to low-income students and the state produced by grant aid 
programs like TEXAS Grants.  
In Chapter 4, I used panel data at the school-district level to perform a school-
district fixed effects regression analysis relating changes in dual-credit participation to 
corresponding changes in secondary and postsecondary student outcomes. This study 
contributed to the existing literature on the impact of dual credit by using a school district-
level analysis that emphasized the effects of dual credit as a school-district policy. Previous 
studies individually compared students who enrolled in dual credit to those who did not. 
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But, a student’s choice to enroll in dual credit was potentially endogenous and may have 
produced biased effects if, say, students who already had clear college plans were more 
likely to be enrolled in dual credit.   
This dual-credit impact study broke new ground by following students up to 13 
years from when they first entered high school to estimate dual-credit effects on 
educational attainment from high school to graduate degree completion. This study also 
explored whether dual-credit effects varied between different dual-credit course subjects. 
For a limited set of shorter-term outcomes, the study also investigated whether instructors 
with a doctoral degree produced a different impact from those with a master’s degree; 
whether impacts varied by instruction mode; and whether dual-credit courses located on a 
high school campus produced a different impact than those located on university or 
community college campuses. Finally, this study explored dosage effects of dual credit to 
determine whether effect sizes plateaued or declined at higher levels of participation. 
The findings of this study highlighted dual credit as a systemic innovation that 
integrates our historically fragmented education system and has the effect of boosting 
postsecondary degree attainment. 
In Chapter 5, this dissertation concludes with a discussion of the implications of the 
three independent studies. It also offers policy recommendations to expand the benefits of 
TEXAS Grants and dual credit.  
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Chapter 2 
Texas Higher Education Finance during Periods of Bipartisan and 
Republican Leadership, 1995 to 2013 
In 2003, the Republican Party assumed complete control of the state government 
of Texas. Having been in the minority as a political party since Reconstruction, 
Republicans set out to make their mark on state government including its funding of higher 
education. During the eight years before 2003, Republicans and Democrats shared control 
of state government and produced a record of bipartisan legislation in higher education 
finance, primarily led by Democrats. This study examined the history of higher education 
finance policymaking eight years before and eleven years after the shift to one-party 
Republican leadership. It analyzed this policy history using the analytic lens of the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Its research questions were the following: (1) What were the deep core beliefs 
and policy beliefs that motivated policy actors to advocate for policy changes in higher 
education finance in Texas from 1995 to 2013? (2) How did change from bipartisan 
leadership to one-party Republican leadership affect the policymaking process? 
Using a descriptive statistical analysis of proposed and passed legislation and a 
qualitative analysis of public documents, this study found evidence of three distinct 
advocacy coalitions: the Egalitarian Coalition, the Free-Market Coalition, and the 
University Coalition. Their names were meant to reflect their deep core beliefs.  
The history of these coalitions affirmed existing theories of political and policy 
decision-making. In summary, the governing coalition in control sets the policy agenda, 
selects the policy options, and controls what becomes law. Minority coalitions can affect 
policy change, but they are confined to the domain of policy preferences shared with the 
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governing coalition. External shocks, such as a change in the elected majority or an 
economic recession, can affect policy change, but only if exploited by skilled leadership. 
A dominant coalition will affect policy change within every decision-making venue where 
it can. A minority coalition can function as a dominant coalition if it is in a position to act 
as a veto player (Tsebelis, 2000)2. 
THEORY 
I used two theories to frame and ground my analysis: the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) first developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988) and the cognitive 
linguistic theory of liberal and conservative moral politics (Moral Politics) developed by 
Lakoff (2002). I selected the ACF because it explains complex policymaking processes 
that involve multiple policy actors from different levels and branches of government. It 
also emphasized the beliefs and values held by policy actors in explaining policy change, 
a central concern of this study. I selected Lakoff’s Moral Politics to ground my 
interpretation of higher education policies in an existing body of research on policy 
preferences and to link party affiliations to liberal and conservative worldviews.  
The following subsections define the key concepts of each theory used in this paper.  
Advocacy Coalition Framework 
Advocacy Coalition  
ACF defines an advocacy coalition as an informal network of policy actors, united 
by a common policy belief system, which advocates for its policy beliefs over an extended 
period. These policy actors can include elected and appointed government officials, policy 
                                               
2 A veto player, as defined by Tsebelis (2000), is a policy actor or group of actors that maybe in the 
minority but are strategically located within a decision-making process to stop the adoption of a policy 
change to protect the status-quo that they prefer. An example maybe a group of four legislators on a 
committee of seven that has undisputed jurisdiction over all policy changes of a given subject in question. 
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researchers and analysts, political consultants and donors, and anyone else attempting to 
affect policy in a given policy subsystem over time.  
The pursuit of common policy goals forms trust between policy actors, which leads 
to the formation of advocacy coalitions. By joining an advocacy coalition, policy actors 
lower their costs of advocacy. Joining occurs by sharing information or coordinating their 
activities to a minimal but nontrivial degree. Coalitions also form out of a sense of fear or 
paranoia that other actors with opposing beliefs are working together to affect policy first. 
ACF refers to this phenomena as devil shift. Devil shift exaggerates the perceived threat of 
an opposing coalition, overestimating an opposing coalition’s plotting and resources. 
Policy Subsystem 
ACF holds that “policymaking in modern societies is so complex, both 
substantively and legally, that participants must specialize if they are to have any hope of 
being influential. This specialization occurs within policy subsystems composed of 
participants who regularly seek to influence policy within a policy subsystem” (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007, p.192). A policy subsystem is typically defined by a policy and territorial 
dimension. In this study, the policy subsystem is higher education finance in Texas. 
Policy Belief System 
The ACF holds that a policy belief system of an advocacy coalition is an aggregated 
distribution of the beliefs held by its members. It consists of three layers of beliefs. First, 
there are deep core beliefs, which consist of normative and ontological beliefs. Deep core 
beliefs apply to a coalition’s view of the entire system of government. They are the hardest, 
if not impossible, to change. 
Policy beliefs make up the second layer of a belief system. Policy beliefs are an 
application of deep core beliefs onto the policy decisions of a policy subsystem. Policy 
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beliefs are also difficult to change but may evolve over a decade or more. Policy beliefs 
are more unbending the more they are about the norms of government, society, or human 
behavior. Actors within a coalition will show substantial consensus on issues about their 
policy beliefs. When policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents 
tends to be rather stable over time. 
Secondary beliefs comprise the third and final layer of a belief system. An actor or 
coalition will give up their secondary policy beliefs before acknowledging weaknesses in 
their policy core beliefs. Secondary beliefs can be negotiated. They are typically narrow in 
scope. They can be rules for implementing a policy. They can also be policy beliefs that 
are conditionally applied, such as a pilot program that applies a policy change but only in 
a certain location (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p.194). 
External Shocks 
ACF explains policy change with four possible causal pathways. The first involves 
external shocks. External shocks that occur during this study period involve changes in 
system-wide governing coalitions, such as the shift from bipartisan state leadership to one-
party Republican control. External shocks also include policy changes from other 
subsystems, such as decisions to cut state taxes. They also include changes in public 
opinion, and changes in socioeconomic conditions. ACF asserts that external shocks are 
not sufficient to produce policy change. They must be exploited by skilled leadership 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 191). 
Moral Politics 
The cognitive linguistic theory of moral politics developed by Lakoff (2002) 
explains how conservatives and liberals think and talk about what it means to be a good 
person and to do right in the world. It rests on the finding in cognitive science that human 
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brains use unconscious conceptual systems, often expressed as metaphors, to frame their 
thinking and talking. The metaphor of the nation as a family is central to this theory of 
moral politics (Moral Politics). 
In the nation-as-a-family metaphor liberals believe the ideal government is like a 
nurturing parent that is responsible for caring for its citizens, protecting them against 
external dangers. Government’s principal goal is for its citizens to live fulfilled and happy 
lives, “deriving meaning from mutual interaction and care” (Lakoff, 2002). When 
government ensures the needs of its citizens are met–having nutritious food, health care, 
housing, and education–its citizens will be more productive, responsible, and better 
equipped to care for themselves, their neighbors, and their community. Consequently, they 
believe education is a public good. They also believe those who need help should be helped 
before those who can care for their own needs. 
Liberals conceptualize government spending on education as an investment in the 
development of its citizens into self-nurturing, productive, and socially responsible 
citizens. Education programs that do not improve these outcomes are failed investments 
and must be fixed by government action. Finally, a government that fails to take action 
when its citizens are unable to care for themselves, while others have more than enough, is 
morally irresponsible.  
The Conservative view of government is also rooted in a family metaphor but of a 
different ideal family. Conservatives believe that the ideal government is like a strict father 
whose role is to set and enforce rules of behavior so that citizens learn “[s]elf-discipline, 
self-reliance, and respect for legitimate authority” (Lakoff, 2002). Government’s role is not 
to coddle citizens with social programs, which drain their self-discipline and individual 
initiative, but to ensure that a ladder of opportunity exists and that everyone has access to 
it. With a ladder of opportunity in place–an adequate education, a right to work, freedom 
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from crime–citizens can improve their own lives. And, anyone who fails to climb the ladder 
of opportunity only has themselves to blame.  
Market principles, such as individual choice, limited government, and property 
rights, hold a powerful place in the beliefs of conservatives. They consider market 
outcomes to be virtuous because they are the product of individual choice and enterprise. 
They believe markets are more efficient and productive than government. They also believe 
an expanding government stifles markets and individual self-reliance, which means fewer 
jobs and less economic growth. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Seven studies were found in peer-reviewed journals plus another two in published 
dissertations that used the ACF to identify advocacy coalitions and explain changes in state 
higher education finance in the US3. This section reviews their relevant findings.  
State governments found higher education spending to be an easy target in times of 
revenue shortfalls. Legislators recognized that institutions of higher education have 
alternative funding mechanisms to mitigate state budget cuts: grants, private endowments, 
student tuition and fees, and, in some cases like Texas community colleges, taxing 
authority. Also, higher education spending, unlike public primary and secondary education 
in many states including Texas, was not a constitutional state requirement. It also lacked 
federal matching requirements such as those tied to federal Medicaid funds. Consequently, 
in a competition for state general revenue dollars, primary and secondary public education 
and health spending tended to crowd out higher education spending (Harnisch, 2016).  
                                               
3 I used the online search engine at the library system at University of Texas at Austin to search the 
libraries at the university. I also performed a search of the PAIS and used the Google Scholar search 
engine. I searched for articles published in peer-reviewed journals and dissertations that included the terms 
university, college, or higher education and advocacy coalition framework. I did not limit my search to a 
date range but did limit it to articles analyzing state policy in the US. 
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Existing research also suggested that other budget priorities have stronger political 
constituencies (Harnisch, 2016). In Texas, this was debatable. The University of Texas at 
Austin and Texas A&M University had large networks of alumni, many of them were 
leaders in business and politics. As shown in the Policy History section, these groups 
effectively advocated on behalf of their alma maters. 
Existing research that analyzed higher education in Texas during the time period of 
this study identified two advocacy coalitions. One case study that primarily relied on 
interviews identified and named one coalition the Egalitarian coalition, a name this study 
carried forward. In 2001, the Egalitarian coalition helped pass a state law allowing 
undocumented immigrants residing in Texas to pay in-state resident tuition (ISRT). This 
coalition was found to consider access to higher education a social justice, equal rights 
issue. Its members primarily included Hispanic and African-American Democratic 
legislators and civil rights organizations, including the Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Education Fund (MALDEF), League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), 
National Council of La Raza (NCLR), and the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP). It also included Hispanic Chambers of Commerce 
(Dougherty, Nienhusser, & Vega, 2010).  
The Egalitarian coalition was successful in Texas because it found common ground 
with a business-led advocacy coalition, unnamed in the existing literature. The Egalitarian 
coalition did this by framing ISRT for undocumented residents in terms of workforce 
development and economic objectives, describing the policy change as in the state’s 
economic self-interest.  
The Texas business-led advocacy coalition included business associations, 
Governor Rick Perry, and most Republican legislators in the 2001 legislature. It viewed 
higher education as a strategy for economic development and a means for growing a 
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competitive labor market. In an interview regarding ISRT for undocumented residents, a 
Texas business leader said, “[Business organizations] are pretty pragmatic…[M]ost 
business organizations, at least the ones I know, are not going to split hairs on the pedigree 
of that person. Educate them if they’re here.” (Dougherty, Nienhusser, & Vega, 2010) 
The existing literature suggested that business-led policy coalitions advanced 
policy agendas with a common set of proposals. These included performance-based 
funding; cost-containment facilities management techniques; online courses; strategies that 
efficiently integrate secondary to postsecondary education such as dual credit4 or Advanced 
Placement (AP) programs; career pathways that favor technical skills over liberal arts; 
commercialization of university research; and incentives for timely degree completion. 
Business-led coalitions were found to provide skilled leadership that was successful at 
changing the allocation of existing higher education funds rather than growing state 
spending on higher education (Harnisch, 2006; Dougherty, Nienhusser, & Vega, 2010; 
Dougherty, et al., 2013; Protopsaltis, 2008).  
There was a final set of policy actors that appeared in the literature but were not 
developed as an advocacy coalition—university and community college administrators. 
These actors were treated as policy brokers, arbitrators who mediate conflict between 
competing coalitions and seek stability for the policy subsystem. The existing literature did 
not identify their policy beliefs. It also did not consider their role as policy brokers as a 
strategy for advancing a policy agenda (Shakespeare, 2008). The policy broker concept 
was an area of the ACF that theoreticians recognized as underdeveloped (Weible, Sabatier, 
& McQueen, 2009).  
                                               
4 Dual credit programs allowed high school students to enroll in college-level coursework and 
simultaneously earn high school and college credit. 
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However, behaviors of higher education administrators have been documented. 
Higher education administrators opposed policies that threaten their funding or their 
administrative discretion. They viewed performance-based funding with skepticism, 
believing it was intended to rationalize budget cuts. When they did support performance-
based funding, they did so reluctantly and with the hope that their cooperation would 
improve their chance of greater funding or autonomy (Dougherty et al., 2013; Protopsaltis, 
2008).  
Of the states studied, a change in the political control of the legislature coupled with 
skilled policy leadership increased the likelihood of policy changes. For example, the 
adoption of performance-based funding followed a change in political party leadership in 
Colorado, Missouri, Florida, South Carolina, Illinois, Washington, Michigan, and Virginia. 
While coalitions can cross party lines, a switch to Republican control typically 
strengthened the business-led coalition relative to others. When this occurred advocates of 
performance-based funding were successful (Dougherty et al., 2013; Harnisch, 2016; 
Protopsaltis 2008). 
Contribution to Existing Literature 
This study has contributed to the existing literature by studying one policy 
subsystem over an extended period of time, using a mixed-methods approach, and 
answering new research questions. It was the first study of state higher education policy 
that reviewed 19 years of legislation, allowing it to follow a subsystem across changing 
political leadership and other external factors to describe in greater detail policy belief 
systems. Finally, it focused on the transition from bipartisan to one-party Republican 
leadership, allowing it to portend the future of policy change in other states that 
experience a similar shift in leadership. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
I designed this study to be a theory-based case study with qualitative and 
quantitative methods. I started with defining my research questions and identifying relevant 
theoretical propositions. I then determined the selection of the Texas higher education 
policy subsystem as the unit of analysis to be followed over a period that spanned bipartisan 
and one-party Republican leadership, 1995 to 2013. (Yin, 2014). 
I made state legislation the primary data for uncovering policy beliefs. And I used 
a review of state government reports, news reports, and public statements by key policy 
actors to validate my findings and enrich them. My validation process also involved 
analyzing the history of policy, integrating the coalitions identified with their actions across 
the study period. 
METHODOLOGY 
An advocacy coalition is a theoretical construct. It is not seen but inferred. As such, 
I inferred membership in a given coalition based on a legislator’s party affiliation. Though 
advocacy coalitions are not political parties, when political parties are highly polarized 
along a liberal-conservative spectrum, as they are in Texas (Jones, 2013), theories about 
the policy and deep core beliefs of liberals and conservatives can be leveraged to interpret 
the beliefs of Democratic and Republican legislators.  
But were political parties highly polarized in Texas during the period studied? I 
tested this assumption by analyzing an ideological score of each legislator in each 
legislation during the study period. The ideological score reflected the legislator’s degree 
of liberalism or conservatism along a spectrum of liberal to conservative ideology. These 
scores were derived from their voting records during the study period (Jones, 2013).  
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I used a truncated regression analysis5 to model the relationship between party 
affiliation and liberal (or conservative) ideology. As described by Equation A1, the 
expected liberal-conservative score of legislator i at time t (Libcon_scoreit) was modeled 
as 
 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒+, = 	𝛼 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡+, + 𝑆𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, + 𝜀+,,																																			(𝐴1) 
where Democratit was a dummy variable indicating Democratic affiliation of legislator i at 
time t, 𝛽2represented the Democratic effect, 𝑆𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, represented the time fixed effects, 𝛼 
represented a constant term, and 𝜀+, represented the error term. As shown in Table A1, 
party affiliation as a Democrat moved a legislator’s liberal-conservative score from .61 to 
-.59, a swing of -1.2 points. Party affiliation was a statistically significant and meaningful 
predictor of ideology. 
Having confirmed political parties were highly polarized, I leveraged the theories 
of Moral Politics (Lakoff, 2002) to interpret and analyze the policy preferences of two 
advocacy coalitions: one liberal and one conservative. I began this process by using Moral 
Politics to draw profiles of the policy belief systems of a liberal and conservative advocacy 
coalition within a higher education finance subsystem. 
I then used a data set of higher education finance legislation to identify policy 
preferences for liberal and conservative members of the Texas legislature. I did this by 
calculating the probability of liberals and conservatives filing a given topic of higher 
education finance, respectively.  
I then integrated the policy preference measures into the profiles of the two policy 
belief systems. I then validated and enriched this analysis with insights from supplementary 
                                               
5 Truncated regression analysis was used because the data analyzed ranged from negative one to positive 
one. 
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documents (committee reports, news reports, State of the State addresses, and other public 
documents). 
I identified a third coalition using a purely qualitative approach. I assumed higher 
education public administrators are policy brokers who belong to an advocacy coalition. I 
then tested this assumption based on a review of the supplementary documents. I could not 
use an analysis of legislation to identify the policy preferences of university and community 
college administrators because Texas prohibits state employees from giving testimony in 
committee for or against legislation. However, state law did not limit these administrators 
from stating their general policy preferences outside the legislature. Nor did it restrict the 
actions of their supporters. These statements and actions as reported in public documents 
allowed me to build a profile of this third coalition’s policy belief system. 
Study Limitations 
This case study was limited by its small sample size. Although this case study 
produced significant internal validity with deep insights into higher education 
policymaking in Texas, analysts must take care in directly applying the findings to other 
cases or settings. 
This analysis was also vulnerable to my biases as the researcher and someone who 
participated in the policymaking processes studied. I served as an elected Democratic 
member of the Texas House of Representatives from 2000 to 2015. I served on the 
education appropriations committee, participated in many of the higher education debates, 
and authored numerous higher education bills. This experience gave me unique first-person 
insights, including a deep understanding of the workings of the legislature, the issues of 
the time, and the advocacy groups engaged in higher education finance. However, it also 
increased the likelihood of bias, specifically confirmation bias. To mitigate this threat, I 
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reflected on my potential biases and preconceived notions before and during the study to 
prevent them from distorting the analysis.  
DATA 
I collected data on the Texas higher education finance subsystem from five types 
of public documents from 1995 to 2013: legislation, government agency reports, news 
articles, state of the state addresses by the governor, and public documents referred to in 
news articles (such as public letters, speeches, press releases, and web content). 
I identified and downloaded bills proposed during the legislative sessions within 
the study period using the online search engine of the Texas Legislative Council. I used the 
following classifications to find relevant bills: Education-Higher-Finance; Education-
Higher-Student Fees; Education-Higher-Student Financial Aid; and Education-Higher-
Tuition. 
I then read through each of the 2,380 bills downloaded to ensure the final dataset 
was limited to the following higher education finance subjects: student tuition or fees, 
institutional funding, facilities funding, student financial aid, higher education cost control 
measures, and college savings programs. This filtering process resulted in a population of 
1,373 bills. Bills that addressed financial processes (such as accounting methods, payment 
or refund methods), studies, or notifications were excluded. 
The librarians of the Texas Legislative Reference Library helped me locate relevant 
state government agency reports, the Governor’s State of the State Addresses, and news 
articles. We found 14 reports dealing with some aspect of higher education finance. Using 
LexisNexis, we also found 223 printed news articles dealing with tuition deregulation, 
TEXAS Grants, and dual-credit policies from Texas newspapers, Texas Monthly, and the 
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Texas Tribune. I chose these topics because they produced conflict and compromise across 
different groups and challenged different deep core beliefs.   
I analyzed the content of the legislation in a multistep process. I first read the 
legislation, developed a set of codes that characterizes the proposed policy solutions, and 
then coded each bill on a second and third reading with the following labels: Democratic 
primary author, Republican primary author, tax-credit-financed student aid, privatization, 
college cost containment, research funding, technical education, tuition deregulation, 
tuition regulation, student fee increase, college credit transferability, institutional funding, 
tuition or fee exemption, student loan program, facilities funding, TEXAS Grants, student 
financial aid, merit-based student financial aid, need-based student financial aid, dual 
credit, pre-paid savings program, in-state resident tuition (ISRT) for undocumented 
residents, removal of ISRT for undocumented residents, and affirmative action. I derived 
these labels from a manifest analysis of the bills. Bills coded with a given topic promoted 
the topic unless specified otherwise.  
Due to resource limitations, I was the only reader involved in the coding process. I 
used a computer-assisted coding system named MAXQDA. It allowed me to store all 
documents, record my coding system, and apply a uniform set of codes. Future research 
should enlist other readers to ensure the replicability of the coding process. 
MAXQDA also allowed me to produce a data table that described each higher 
education finance bill with a complete set of variables reflecting the codes. This allowed 
me to perform the statistical descriptive analysis of legislation. 
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POLICY BELIEF SYSTEMS 
Three advocacy coalitions competed to advance their policy and deep core beliefs 
on higher education finance in Texas from 1995 to 2013. This study named them the 
Egalitarian Coalition, the Free-Market Coalition, and the University Coalition. 
The Egalitarian Coalition 
The Egalitarian Coalition was an advocacy coalition that included liberal 
legislators. The liberal-conservative score of legislators of the Egalitarian Coalition ranged 
from an average per session of -.41 to -.69.  
The Egalitarian Coalition’s legislative members reflected the racial and ethnic 
composition of the state. Of these legislators, 40 percent were Hispanic, 15 percent were 
African American, and the remaining 45 percent were White. Hispanic and African-
American legislators were the most prolific authors of higher education finance legislation 
in the Egalitarian Coalition. Hispanic and African-American legislators filed 48 and 25 
percent of the Egalitarian Coalition’s legislation, respectively. 
Other members of the Egalitarian Coalition included the civil rights organizations 
identified in the literature review, labor unions, and advocates at the Center for Public 
Policy Priorities.  
The Egalitarian coalition viewed higher education as a public resource that 
government, led by democratically elected officials, had a responsibility to deliver. They 
believed higher education was a means for social and economic mobility and equality. By 
earning a college education, they believed people would improve their ability to take care 
of themselves and others in their community. They also believed limited resources should 
be prioritized to help those with the greatest need.   
The legislation they filed supported this characterization. As shown in Figure A1, 
legislators of the Egalitarian Coalition authored 100 percent of the legislation promoting 
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affirmative action policies intended to close the gap in college enrollment between minority 
and White students. They authored legislation providing ISRT to undocumented Texas 
residents. They also authored a disproportionate share of bills that provided need-based 
financial aid, regulated tuition, exempted some students from paying tuition and fees, 
promoted dual-credit and college credit transfer policies, all types of student financial aid 
including merit aid and loans, and raised tax dollars dedicated to higher education.  
Policy narratives illustrate policy beliefs (McBeth, Shanahan, & Jones 2004). The 
basic story the Egalitarian Coalition told about policies they supported cast government 
action as the hero, a system (either a set of laws or market forces) that fails to help students 
who need help as the villain, and students as victims. Collateral victims were the families 
who struggled to send their children to college and a larger society that lost the potential 
of its less educated. The moral of their story was that government action through public 
policies like tuition regulation, TEXAS Grants, or dual credit helped students who would 
otherwise not be able to gain access to college, and by helping these students, the individual 
and larger society benefited. The following quotes were examples of this basic narrative: 
In anticipation of the passage of TEXAS Grants, Rep. Irma Rangel said: “I hope 
that (new scholarships) will increase access to education to many more 
students…Educate (all the students), because otherwise we will all be responsible 
for a great disaster upon our economy (Falkenberg, 1999).” 
Rep. Garnet Coleman in his opposition to tuition deregulation said: “It’s a tax on 
the middle-income families. The way we are getting new revenue is through 
people who are trying to better themselves (Flores & Stone, 2003).” 
Rep. Veronica Gonzales, a legislator from the Rio Grande Valley, on the effects 
of a roll back of dual credit said, “If that happens we are going to have a lot of 
doors closing on a lot of students. It would be especially bad for our area because 
so many of our students cannot afford to take these classes at full credit and pay 
the full amount (Bertron & Taylor, 2011).”  
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The Free-Market Coalition 
The Free-Market Coalition was an advocacy coalition that included conservative 
legislators. The liberal-conservative score of legislators of the Free-Market Coalition 
ranged from an average per session of .50 to .62.  
The ethnic and racial composition of the Free-Market Coalition did not reflect the 
demographics of Texas. Of these legislators, 4 percent were Hispanic, 1 percent were 
African American, 1 percent were Asian, and the remaining 94 percent were White. White 
legislators authored 96 percent of its legislation related to higher education finance. 
Other policy actors of the Free-Market Coalition included individual businessmen, 
the Texas Association of Business, and the Texas Public Policy Foundation. 
The Free-Market Coalition viewed government spending on higher education as a 
necessary evil for producing skilled workers and entrepreneurs and creating innovations 
through research, primarily in fields of science, technology, engineering, and medicine, 
that could be commercialized. They assessed the value of higher education like a business, 
giving special attention to performance measures such as total degree production, cost per 
degree produced, average earnings per degree program, and research dollars generated per 
researcher. The legislation they filed reflects this characterization.  
As shown in Figure A1, conservative legislators of the Free-Market Coalition 
authored all legislation promoting performance-based funding policies intended to increase 
degree production, research dollars generated, and reward cost containment. They also 
authored all legislation related to privatizing aspects of higher education finance and 
providing tax reductions to business that donate to college scholarship funds. The Free-
Market Coalition authored a disproportionate share of bills that eliminated student financial 
aid for undocumented Texas residents, contained college costs, deregulated tuition by 
moving tuition-setting authority closer to the universities, used tuition rebates to 
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incentivize timely degree completion, and promoted research and technical education. 
They opposed Egalitarian proposals to increase government spending on higher education 
through increased taxes (SJR9-80; SB2527-81).  
In-state resident tuition (ISRT) for undocumented residents represented a 
controversial issue for the Free-Market Coalition. In the first half of the study period, it 
supported ISRT for undocumented residents because they believed it was good for 
business. However, in the second half of the study period, a subgroup of its legislators that 
viewed immigration as a threat and cost to society grew in size. Its mixed record on bills 
related to immigration reflected an internal conflict for the Free-Market Coalition. 
The basic story the Free-Market Coalition told about policies they authored cast 
college administrators and faculty as villains who were overpaid and lazy, students and 
taxpayers as victims, and free-market solutions as heroes. The moral of their story began 
with identifying the problem: administrators who were paid high salaries and faculty who 
taught few classes burdened taxpayers and failed to meet the needs of our economy. Free-
market principles could discipline these wasteful government employees, so they become 
productive and cost-efficient; thereby reducing the burden to taxpayers, helping more 
students access and complete college, and growing our economy. The following quotes 
were examples of this narrative. 
In its final report, a state commission, formed and led by members of the Free-
Market Coalition, stated: “[The Commission] recommends a redesign of the 
funding of higher education combined with a reduction of bureaucratic controls. 
Such a redesign would seek to empower parents and their children and improve 
access to higher education by offering grants to students who meet clearly defined 
requirements for college preparation. The redesign would also seek to create a 
system that is more flexible and responsive to the needs of our economy and its 
citizens… [A] less regulated, freer market orientation will result in better resource 
allocation decisions than a more regulated market subject to controls by 
centralized authorities (Special Commission, 2001).”  
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Jeff Sandefer, a businessman and member of the Free-Market Coalition, explains 
his support of higher education finance reform: "It's time for the Texas 
Legislature to stop writing 'blank checks' to our state colleges and universities for 
tenured professors to spend as they please…Instead, all state higher education 
funding should be directed to scholarships, so universities once again will have to 
answer to the people who pay the bills. That's the only way students, parents, and 
taxpayers will ever regain control of our universities. (Patel, 2010)" 
The University Coalition 
The University Coalition was an advocacy coalition that included public 
administrators of universities and community colleges. 6 The public administrators who led 
the University Coalition were university and community college presidents, chancellors of 
higher education systems, and government affairs professionals at colleges and 
universities. The University Coalition also included policy actors who loosely coordinated 
their advocacy for policies that increased funding and autonomy for institutions of higher 
education. These policy actors included alumni, philanthropists, faculty associations, the 
Texas Association of Community Colleges, and the Association of American Universities. 
Alumni and donors represented key members of their coalition. These members 
provided the University Coalition political resources in the form of money and citizens 
who would called on their elected representatives. Their alumni and donors ran political 
action committees with names like “Friends of the University PAC,” which donated to the 
campaigns of elected officials and hired lobbyists and public relations professionals (Texas 
Ethics Commission, 2017). 
The University Coalition believed its institutions of higher education were public 
institutions with broad public missions to educate and serve society. Like the Free-Market 
Coalition, they too believed that their institutions were engines of economic activity. Like 
the Egalitarian Coalition, they too believed that their institutions were instruments for 
                                               
6 I shortened the name from the University and Community College Coalition for brevity and because most 
of the documented conflict during the study period involved public universities. 
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social justice and advancement. However, they also believed their mission was about the 
intellectual cultivation of their students and the expansion of human knowledge produced 
by their faculty. They believed education was an end goal not only a means to an end. 
Furthermore, they believed that institutions of higher education were complex 
enterprises built over time with engaged faculty, students, donors, and alumni. They 
believed their greatest asset was their faculty and that their greatest challenge was attracting 
and keeping talented faculty. They believed the work of building a quality institution of 
higher education occurred with their faculty in classrooms and laboratories. As a result, 
they believed the loss of administrative autonomy harmed their ability to strengthen their 
institutions.  
The University Coalition supported tuition deregulation because it came with the 
promise of greater autonomy. They opposed any policy reforms that “micromanaged” how 
they operate. They opposed performance-based funding that did not take into account their 
different missions and respective student bodies. Instead, they supported increases in direct 
funding with broadly defined outcome measures that evaluated each institution relative to 
its past track record of performance.  
The basic story that the University Coalition told about policies they supported cast 
their faculty and researchers as heroes, policies that underfunded postsecondary education 
or lessened their administrative discretion as villains, and students and our society as 
victims. The moral of their story was that with more resources and autonomy their 
institutions could help more people complete college and advance our society.  
The following quotes from the former President of the University of Texas in his 
2011 State of the University speech illustrated how the University Coalition viewed their 
mission and exemplified their policy narrative: 
 26 
“[Students] will have a richer life [earning a college education], productively, 
financially, intellectually, and even spiritually. If enough of them do this, society 
itself will have a richer collective life. (Powers, 2011)”  
 “[By allowing researchers to research topics of their own interest] they will 
increase our collective understanding of the world and our place in it. This 
increased understanding establishes a higher platform from which the next 
generation goes forward. History has clearly shown that societies with a richer 
understanding of the world – that is, of science – and a richer understanding of the 
human condition – that is, of the humanities – are more productive and more 
civilized in the long run. (Powers, 2011)”  
“Our faculty are not the problem. They are our strength. Not only are they not the 
problem, they are a big part of the solutions to the very real challenges we do 
face…We simply need to be given the space to [improve graduation rates]. If we 
aren’t, if we are pulled hither and yon from one project to another, we won’t be 
able to accomplish our mission. Put bluntly, tilting at the windmills of supposed 
faculty who don’t work hard or who don’t care about our undergraduates – for all 
the rhetoric about dodgers and coasters – will simply divert us from the real tasks 
at hand. And it will severely damage our ability to attract and retain our talent. 
(Powers, 2011)” 
The University Coalition was not monolithic. Two substantive issues divided two-
year institutions from four-year institutions: dual-credit and college credit transfer policies. 
Community college administrators were found to make public statements supporting the 
expansion of dual credit and the creation of a statewide system of college credit transfer, 
while administrators of four-year institutions were found to make public statements less 
supportive or opposed to these policies (Austin, 2007; Mellon, 2008; Holloway, 2010).  
A second division of the University Coalition separated the well-endowed research 
universities from the regional universities that had fewer resources and less selective 
admission standards. This study found regional college advocates perceived tuition 
deregulation as a solution that served the more highly-selective universities. And they 
feared that its passage would lead to less state support for regional universities (Meritz, 
2003). 
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POLICY HISTORY 
Prologue 
After Reconstruction, Texas, like other former Confederate states, was a one-party 
Democratic state dominated by conservatives. Conservatives advanced their policy beliefs 
by nominating conservative candidates to run as Democrats in the general election and on 
occasion voting for Republican presidential candidates considered more conservative, such 
as in the election of President Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. Conservatives, ideologically 
compatible with Republicans, began shifting to the Republican Party in the 1960s after the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act and once they established their electoral viability. 
Republicans unified their constituencies with messages of states’ rights and local control, 
low-taxes, pro-business, and family values. Rick Perry was emblematic of a high-profile 
Texan who came up the ranks as a Democrat, only to join the Republican Party, and 
eventually lead the state as its longest-serving governor.  
The 1980’s represented a transition period when Republicans were growing their 
field organization and Democrats of liberal to moderate leaning controlled their party. In 
1982, a slate of Democrats won statewide election. All were re-elected in 1986, except for 
Governor Mark White. In 1990, Democrats won all statewide elections. The period of state 
government led by liberal-to-moderate Democrats lasted for 12 years, ending in 1994 when 
all but one statewide Democratic officeholder lost re-election (Davidson, 1990).  
Bipartisanship 
Elections 
During the legislative cycles of 1995 to 2001, Republican and Democratic state 
officials shared power. Republicans held the Governor’s office, the Comptroller’s office, 
the Office of Attorney General, and a majority in the Senate. Democrats held a majority in 
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the House of Representatives (the House) and for part of the time held the Lt. Governor’s 
office. 
Democrats were outnumbered. However, they held the advantage of the status quo. 
For the prior 12 years, their Egalitarian Coalition had set in place the policies that defined 
how and at what levels the state would support higher education. This created a strategic 
opportunity for the Egalitarian Coalition. Because their liberal members controlled the 
House, they held veto authority over any proposed changes to existing laws. The 
Egalitarian Coalition was what Tsebelis (2000) calls a “veto player.” 
Though there was a genuine spirit at the time for doing “what’s right for [Texas]” 
regardless of party (Sweany, 2013), when Republican candidate George W. Bush defeated 
incumbent Democratic Governor Ann Richards, he had no experience in elected office and 
faced a Democratically-controlled state legislature, as shown in Figure A2. Governor 
Bush’s first decision was to make friends with the presiding officers of the legislature, 
Democratic Lt. Governor Bob Bullock and Democratic Speaker of the House Pete Laney. 
Lt. Governor Bullock mentored Governor Bush before retiring at the end of Bush’s first 
term (McNeely & Henderson, 2008).  
In 1998, the Republican Party elected Rick Perry to what many considered the most 
powerful elected office in Texas, the Office of the Lt. Governor. The Texas Lt. Governor 
presided over the Texas Senate and held significant authority over the state’s budget and 
legislative process. However, the newfound legislative authority of conservatives, and their 
Free-Market Coalition, was tempered by Governor Bush’s interest in the US Presidency. 
In 1999, Governor Bush formed an exploratory committee and began preparing to 
run for the presidency as a governor who was “a uniter, not a divider.” Fighting with the 
Democratic-controlled House would have been counterproductive for his state agenda and 
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national run. During this legislative cycle, the Egalitarian Coalition maintained its role as 
a veto player in the House (Balz, 1999; Horowitz, 1999; Mitchell, 2000).  
The 2000 election cycle proved momentous for national and Texas government. 
When Governor Bush became the 82nd US President, Rick Perry ascended to the 
Governor’s Office, and for the first time in its history, the Texas Senate elected a member 
from its ranks to fill the Lieutenant Governor’s position. Republican Bill Ratliff became 
the Lt. Governor with the help of a united block of Democrats and enough independent 
Republican state senators. Once again, the Egalitarian Coalition maintained its control of 
the House. These events allowed the Egalitarian Coalition to effectively act as the 
governing coalition over the higher education finance subsystem. However, there were 
external events that were outside of its control.  
External Factors 
Dynamic external factors affected the Texas higher education finance subsystem. 
On March 18, 1996, a three-judge panel of the Fifth US Circuit Court of Appeals set off a 
major reaction in higher education policy with the Hopwood v. Texas decision. The court 
opined that any consideration of race by the University of Texas Law School in their 
admissions process was unconstitutional, discarding the state’s desegregation plan 
negotiated with the federal government. In response to the court, State Attorney General 
Dan Morales issued a far-reaching opinion prohibiting the use of affirmative action in 
Texas higher education.  These decisions impacted higher education finance and reduced 
minority student enrollment (Harris & Tienda, 2010; Laycock, 2016). 
State Funding 
During the bipartisan period, the Egalitarian Coalition determined higher education 
finance policy. Their formula consisted of stable direct institutional funding to universities 
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and community colleges, moderate increases to tuition rates that were kept relatively low, 
and student financial aid to encourage college enrollment of lower-income students.  
During the six years of bipartisanship, the state legislature supported public 
colleges with direct funding based on their enrollment levels and allowed for regular but 
limited increases in tuition (HB1792-74, HB2531-77). As shown in Figure A3, state 
institutional funding7 per full-time student remained relatively level, while tuition rates 
increased at an annual average of 6 percent each year between 1996 to 2003. In 2003, the 
last fiscal year budgeted during this period, the state provided universities direct 
institutional funding of $5,8078 for each full-time equivalent student enrolled (not 
including funds for TEXAS Grants or any other student financial aid), while the average 
Texas resident enrolled full-time paid $3,903 in annual tuition and fees (not including 
student financial aid).  
Community colleges in Texas have locally-elected boards with authority to set 
tuition rates and levy property taxes, a revenue source public universities lack. As shown 
in Figure A3, state institutional funding per full-time community college student declined 
by 10 percent between 1996 and 2003. One explanation for this decline was that budget 
writers recognized a growth in the property taxing capacity by community college districts. 
In 2003, the state provided direct funding to community colleges of $2,792 for each full-
time student enrolled, while the average in-district full-time community college student 
paid no less than $1,687 in tuition and fees.  
The most notable change in funding during this period was the creation of a new 
stream of spending dedicated to supporting need-based financial aid. This policy change 
                                               
7 Institutional funding represented state general revenue funding allocated directly to universities to support 
their operations and maintenance of existing facilities. It did not include student grant aid or facilities 
funding for new construction. 
8 All dollar figures in this analysis were expressed as 2016 real dollars. 
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was authored by members of the Egalitarian Coalition. In 2003, the state allocated $193 
million dollars for the Towards Excellence and Access Grant program (TEXAS Grants; 
HB713-76), as shown in Figure A4. TEXAS Grants was the first need-based college 
scholarship program in Texas intended to reach all eligible public college students9. 
Though primarily allocated based on financial need, this scholarship also included 
academic eligibility requirements.  
Chapter 3 presents an evaluation the TEXAS Grants program. 
Substantive Policy Changes 
The Egalitarian Coalition controlled the policy agenda of substantive policy10 
changes. As shown in Figure A5, not one topic passed into law that the Egalitarian 
Coalition was not willing to author. Furthermore, the Egalitarian Coalition passed 
numerous policies that the Free-Market Coalition was unwilling to author. The Egalitarian 
Coalition authored and passed ISRT for undocumented residents with support from some 
members of the Free-Market Coalition. It also authored and passed the creation of TEXAS 
Grants; the creation of the Texas Tomorrow Fund, a prepaid college tuition savings 
program that was guaranteed by the state (HB1336-74, HB8-75, HB9-75); the creation of 
dual credit (HB1336-74; HB3290-76), and the establishment of criteria, largely based on 
student socioeconomics, that could be used in place of affirmative action (HB1641-77).  
Chapter 4 presents an evaluation of Texas’ dual-credit policy. 
The Egalitarian Coalition also authored and passed legislation that created the “Top 
10 Rule.” A policy change that required undergraduate programs of public universities to 
grant automatic admission to students who graduated in the top 10 percent of their 
                                               
9 Previous need-based grant programs were only modestly funded. 
10 Substantive policy was considered policy not dealing with appropriations. 
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graduation class and applied for admission (HB588-75). This policy change would deliver 
a pronounced benefit to minority and rural white students (Long, Saenz, and Tienda, 2010). 
The Free-Market coalition was not without its legislative victories. It authored and 
passed five of six proposals to limit the growth of college costs, and two of three proposals 
to advance technical education. But, its most important legislative achievement involved 
planning its future.  
Planning 
Before the end of the 76th legislative session in 2001, Lt. Governor Rick Perry, a 
leading member of the Free-Market Coalition, established a 17-member commission of 
state senators and leaders in business and higher education. Lt. Governor Perry charged the 
commission with the task of addressing the challenges faced by higher education in the 21st 
Century. Named the Special Commission on 21st Century Colleges and Universities (21st 
Century Commission), it operated at the same time as a previously launched planning 
process of the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (Coordinating Board), which 
operationalized its Closing the Gaps by 2015 goal-setting plan.  
The 21st Century Commission’s report, little noticed at the time, produced a 
roadmap of policy change for the Free-Market Coalition. It emphasized its concern for 
efficiencies and productivity in higher education. It laid out its free-market philosophy, 
stating “[T]he Commission seeks, foremost, to promote the general principle that a less 
regulated, free-market orientation will result in better resource allocation decisions than a 
more regulated market subject to controls by centralized authorities.” It recommended 
“[developing] a system of funding that places greater emphasis on state funding of grants 
to students over direct appropriations to institutions” (Special Commission, 2001). The 
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21st Century Commission’s report represented a major shift in direction and set the course 
of higher education finance for the period of one-party Republican leadership. 
One-Party Republican Leadership 
Elections 
The 2002 election cycle completed the Republican takeover of Texas state 
government. Already in control of every statewide office and the State Senate, Republicans 
gained control of the House by a margin of 92 to 58. Republicans won seats previously 
unwinnable following a redistricting of legislative districts by the Republican Party. Their 
victory marked an end to the Egalitarian Coalition’s role as a veto player.   
The Free-Market Coalition moved forward with its policy agenda. They decreased 
direct funding of higher education institutions by 30 percent from 2003 to 2015. They 
allowed for the increase in student tuition and fees by 60 percent over the same period. 
They mitigated the increase in tuition and fees for lower-income families by setting aside 
more funds for TEXAS Grants. State general revenue dedicated to TEXAS Grants 
increased from $193 million in fiscal year 2003 to $368 million in fiscal year 2015, as 
illustrated in Figure A4. Moreover, the share of eligible students it covered increased from 
approximately 60 percent of eligible 2004 high school graduates to 83 percent of eligible 
2014 high school graduates11.  
External Factors 
The Free-Market Coalition exploited several events outside of the legislative 
process to advance their policy agenda. Texas experienced two downturns in its economy, 
resulting in a decline in state tax revenue. In 2003, the 78th legislature faced a state general 
                                               
11 Coverage rates of TEXAS Grant eligible students were calculated by the author of this study using data 
from the University of Texas at Austin Education Research Center. 
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revenue shortfall of $10.2 billion,12 or a 16.8 percent revenue gap, to maintain level funding 
in the upcoming budget cycle (Legislative Budget Board, 2004). In 2011, the 82nd 
legislature faced a state general revenue shortfall of $9.0 billion,13 or an 11 percent revenue 
gap, to maintain level funding in the upcoming budget cycle (Legislative Budget Board, 
2012). In response to these events, the Free-Market Coalition reduced state spending on 
higher education.  
On November 22, 2005, the State Supreme Court declared Texas’s system of public 
school finance unconstitutional and gave the Legislature until June 1, 2006 to fix it. This 
caused a rewrite of the tax code to generate new state funds to offset the state’s 
unconstitutional overreliance on local property taxes. As a result, the state’s constitutional 
requirements to fund public education, and the conservative leadership’s imperative to not 
increase state per-capita spending, caused the state to shift the balance of state general 
revenue away from higher education and to primary and secondary public education 
(Elliott & Robison, 2005). Total state general revenue for public education increased by 
20.3 percent from the two-year budget of 2006-2007 to 2008-2009, while total state general 
revenue for higher education increased by approximately half that rate, or 10.4 percent, 
over the same period (Legislative Budget Board, 2008).  
Like other states, Texas experienced a growth in health care expenditures due to 
medical cost increases, an aging population, and increases in Medicaid caseloads. From the 
first to the last fiscal year budgeted during this period, 2004 to 2015, general revenue 
allocated for health and human services grew from $9.5 billion to $15.4 billion, an average 
annual growth rate of 6.8 percent. The growth in health and human services required by 
federal matching rules reduced the amount of general revenue available to higher 
                                               
12 The revenue shortfall in nominal dollars in 2003 equaled $7.8 billion. 
13 The revenue shortfall in nominal dollars in 2011 equaled $8.4 billion. 
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education. This budget strain was not experienced to the same degree during the period of 
bipartisan leadership. From 1996 to 2003, state general revenue allocated to health and 
human services grew by an average annual rate of 1.7 percent.   
A final factor external to the Texas higher education policy subsystem was the 
Republican Party’s commitment to reducing the size of government. During the periods of 
bipartisan and one-party Republican leadership, the Republican deep core value for low 
taxes and limited government was unchanging. However, its implications on higher 
education were pronounced in a period of rising costs in public education and health care 
as described above. 
As shown in Figure A7, Texas government spending per capita remained flat during 
the study period and decreased relative to its growing economy. To keep government 
spending from rising while public education and health care spending grew, the state 
government made cuts in other areas and shifted the responsibility of state services to local 
governments. In higher education, the shift was to local governments and students. 
Figure A8 provides a closer examination of state spending. Gross state general 
revenue dollars (GR) followed a slight general positive slope over time. However, GR 
relative to the state’s population remained relatively flat. 
State Funding 
By 2005, students, through their tuition and fees paid, replaced the state as the 
primary funder of university and community college operations, as shown in Figure A3. 
By 2015, the last fiscal year budgeted in this period, public colleges and universities 
received roughly twice as much money from students as from state institutional funding. 
In the last state budget written during this period, the state provided universities direct 
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funding of $4,179 for each full-time student enrolled, while the average Texas resident 
enrolled full-time paid $8,285 in annual tuition and fees in 2015.  
Tuition and fee revenue rose faster than institutional aid declined. Though state 
institutional funding per full-time student declined, universities received more funding 
from the combination of institutional aid and tuition and fee revenue, as indicated by the 
green line in Figure A3. By 2015, the combined revenue streams equaled $12,465 per full-
time student, or $2,755 more than its level in 2003. 
Community colleges also experienced a rise in tuition and fees above state 
institutional funding. By 2015, the state provided community colleges direct funding of 
$1,952 for each full-time student enrolled, while the average full-time community college 
student paid $2,703 in annual tuition and fees, as shown in Figure A3. Like public 
university funding, the combination of institutional aid and tuition and fee revenue 
increased over time. By 2015, the combined revenue streams equaled $4,655 per full-time 
student, or $177 more than its level in 2003. 
Substantive Policy Changes 
The Free-Market Coalition took charge during this partisan period, rewriting major 
higher education policies over the objections of an often-splintered Egalitarian Coalition. 
A coordinated effort between the Free-Market Coalition and the University Coalition 
produced the most significant policy change during this period. Together they passed 
legislation that shifted the authority to set tuition rates from the state legislature to the board 
of regents of each system of public universities (HB3015-78). The Free-Market Coalition 
named this policy “tuition deregulation” because they believed it incorporated free-market 
principals into higher education policy, much as the 21st Century Commission had 
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advocated. Though “tuition deregulation” was not an accurate description, it described the 
policy ideals of the Free-Market Coalition.  
When it seemed that the tuition deregulation stalled, the University Coalition 
dispatched university presidents to meet with legislators and communicate their support 
for tuition deregulation and to assure members they would not dramatically increase tuition 
rates (Kay, 2003). They also supported the inclusion of a requirement to set aside a portion 
of new revenue generated from increased rates to need-based student financial aid. This 
caused some members of the Egalitarian Coalition to support tuition deregulation.  
In sessions that followed the passage of tuition deregulation, the Egalitarian 
Coalition filed 70 bills to undo tuition deregulation or moderate future tuition increases. 
None passed.  
During the one-party Republican leadership period, no topic of higher education 
finance passed that the Free-Market Coalition was not willing to author itself. As shown in 
Figure A6, members of the Free-Market Coalition authored bills that addressed every topic 
that passed into law. From the Egalitarian perspective, this meant that the Egalitarian 
Coalition continued to author higher education bills; however, their bills that passed were 
confined to policy changes that were in line with the deep core values of the Free-Market 
Coalition. For example, their policy changes related to student financial aid represented 
either minor technical changes, an expansion of student loan programs, or the addition of 
merit criteria to existing policies.  
The Free-Market Coalition passed numerous bills that fractured the Egalitarian 
Coalition. These included performance-based funding (HB9-82, SB1-83), cost 
containment measures, the strengthening of merit criteria of TEXAS Grants (SB1007-78, 
SB1227-79, SB1227-79, SB28-82), and new student loan programs (SB4-78, HB1420-78, 
HB2154-81, HB3579-82, SB1720-83, SB620, SB1232-80).  
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Within the 22 cost containment measures, the Free-Market Coalition raised rates 
for excess semester credit hours (HB1890-78 and HB1172-79), capped semester credit 
hours of degree programs (HB3025-82), created incentives to hold courses during off-peak 
hours to optimize the use of existing facilities (HB120-80), and made parents with unpaid 
child support ineligible for state financial aid (HB529-78), to name a few.  
Venue Shopping 
In our federalist system, there are checks and balances to policymaking based on a 
division of power across three branches and levels of government. Advocacy coalitions 
seek out policymaking venues that are to their advantage (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).  
Due to Governor Perry’s longevity in office, by 2006, he had appointed members 
of the Free-Market Coalition to every seat on university governing boards and the 
Coordinating Board. These appointments enabled the Free-Market Coalition to advance its 
policy beliefs within these decision-making venues. This led to more policy victories for 
the Free-Market Coalition, though not without conflict. 
On May 21, 2008, the Governor’s office convened a meeting of public university 
regents to address accountability over rising tuition costs and the goal of raising graduation 
rates. Jeff Sandefer, owner of a for-profit business school, former member of the 21st 
Century Commission, and director of the conservative Texas Public Policy Foundation 
(TPPF), a think tank of the Free-Market Coalition, led the meeting. He urged regents to 
adopt his “Seven Breakthrough Solutions,” policy ideas that he considered to be based on 
free-market principles. Included in his policy solutions were merit pay for teachers and a 
faculty accountability system that separated research from instruction (Young, 2010).  
The regents of the Texas A&M University System were the first to act on the 
Governor’s request. They measured teaching efficiency and productivity based on labor 
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costs, class sizes, and research grant funding generated by faculty at Texas A&M 
University at College Station. System administrators graded professors on their 
profitability to the university and placed them into five categories: “coasters”, “dodgers”, 
“Sherpas”, “pioneers”, and “stars”. Faculty names were color coded in red or black 
depending on their overall profitability. The university was engulfed in scandal when the 
report was posted online, eventually earning the nickname the “Red and Black report.”  
The University Coalition responded. Public opposition by Texas A&M faculty was 
immediate. No faculty offered public support. One of its members, the president of the 
Association of American Universities (AAU) and former president of the University of 
Texas Robert Berdahl, wrote to the A&M Chancellor Mike McKinney urging him to resist 
“ill-conceived calls for 'reform,'” which may cost his flagship university its hard-won 
membership to the AAU. Berdahl states, "separating research from teaching and 
oversimplifying the evaluation of faculty does violence to the values that have produced 
the American universities that are envied and emulated across the globe. Moreover, these 
proposals directly contradict Texas' stated goal of building more research universities 
(Berdahl, 2011; Burka, 2012; Greene & Goodwyn, 2013; Hamilton, 2011a)." 
The Free-Market Coalition’s efforts to affect university system policies also 
included the UT System. Investigative reporting by the Houston Chronicle discovered that 
the Chairman of the UT Board of Regents directed the hiring of a policy analyst who 
previously worked at the TPPF, where he had authored policy briefs questioning the value 
of academic research and promoting the “Seven Breakthrough Solutions” (Hamilton, 
2011b).   
In response, on March 11, 2011, the UT alumni association (Texas Exes), a member 
of the University Coalition, issued a “call to action” to its members to oppose the hiring of 
the TPPF analyst. In a letter to alumni, Texas Exes wrote “Call to action—we need your 
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help to protect the mission and core values of the University of Texas…The UT System 
Board of Regents, led by Chairman Gene Powell, has hired consultants who have publicly 
stated the fundamental view that academic research is not valuable and that tenured faculty 
could be replaced by lower-cost lecturers. These consultants propose a formula that 
excludes research in valuing faculty. They only want to look at any immediate financial 
value of research that can be proven on a current basis.” UT alumni responded to the call 
to action (Texas Exes, 2011; Burka 2012; Hamilton, 2011c).   
On June 16, 2011, members of the University Coalition, which included former 
regents, university presidents, higher education donors, and business leaders, formed a new 
organization called the Texas Coalition for Excellence in Higher Education. In a public 
letter, the executive committee stated, “We are alarmed that some recommendations being 
floated by others – from dramatically expanding enrollment while slashing tuition, to 
separating research and teaching budgets, to seceding from a recognized and respected 
accreditation organization – are a prescription for mediocrity that would have severe and 
negative long-term consequences for our state (Texas Coalition for Excellence in Higher 
Education, 2011).” 
On July 6, 2011, Dean Randy Diehl and the Executive Leadership Team of the 
College of Liberal Arts, all members of the University Coalition, issued a report titled 
“Maintaining Excellence and Efficiency at the University of Texas at Austin: A response 
to the seven “breakthrough solutions” and other proposals. The authors of the report reject 
the “Seven Breakthrough Solutions.” They stated, “We do not believe [the ‘Seven 
Breakthrough Solutions’ are] the right response to the problems now facing higher 
education or one that recognizes The University of Texas at Austin’s proven levels of 
efficiency and excellence in educating Texas students… [T]he TPPF proposals seek to 
approach complex issues with ‘simple tools’ or ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions. If 
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implemented, they will likely lead to structural changes in higher education that will leave 
Texas lagging behind other states and drive top students and faculty away (Diehl, 2011).” 
Though the “Seven Breakthrough Solutions” were never adopted by public 
universities, by 2012 the Free-Market Coalition had focused agency agendas on cost 
containment and degree production. In 2010, the Coordinating Board issued a report 
outlining a policy agenda for higher education cost efficiencies (THECB, 2011). In 2011, 
several universities responded to Governor Perry’s challenge to produce a $10,000 
bachelor’s degree program. On Aug 25, 2011, UT System Chancellor Francisco Cigarroa 
issued a nine-point plan titled “Framework for Advancing Excellence,” which among other 
goals emphasized improving graduation rates and cost efficiencies. In 2012, university 
regents followed Governor Perry’s public request to freeze tuition rates (Burka, 2012). 
DISCUSSION 
Once Republicans took complete control of state government, the Free-Market 
Coalition shifted the onus of funding higher education from the state to students and need-
based financial aid took on a new purpose that was about mitigating the impact of rising 
college costs on low-income students. For public universities, direct institutional funding 
per full-time students declined, but increases in tuition and fees more than made up for the 
decline. 
Another change that followed one-party Republican leadership was who authored 
bills. During the bipartisan period, the Egalitarian Coalition authored all major policy 
changes in higher education finance. During this time, no policy change occurred on a topic 
that members of the Egalitarian Coalition were not willing to author themselves.  
Once Republicans took control of state government, the Egalitarian Coalition was 
sidelined. Major changes in policy were authored by the Free-Market Coalition and often 
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passed over the objections of a splintered Egalitarian Coalition. The Egalitarian Coalition 
still authored bills that became law. However, these had to serve some aspect of the Free-
Market Coalition’s vision of higher education finance.  
The final change associated with the change to one-party Republican leadership 
was the University Coalition’s feeling of vulnerability to the more dominant Free-Market 
Coalition. This was seen in their need to mobilize supporters. Perceived attacks on their 
independence required the University Coalition to rally supporters and develop a formal 
organization called the Texas Coalition for Excellence in Higher Education.  
Two policies were promoted before and after one-party Republican leadership: 
TEXAS Grants and dual credit. These policies likely thrived because the Free-Market and 
Egalitarian Coalitions could sincerely explain their support for these policies. Each 
coalition had their own reason for supporting TEXAS Grants. For the Free-Market 
Coalition, TEXAS Grants represented a voucher-type system that empowered lower-
income students to act like consumers and help bring market discipline to higher education. 
For the Egalitarian Coalition, TEXAS Grants represented government taking responsibility 
for the needs of low-income students who earned admission to college but needed help 
paying for college. In the case of dual credit, both coalitions told a shared story about 
college access and affordability. 
In conclusion, the ACF has been an effective lens for analyzing the behavior of 
large numbers of policy actors attempting to affect policymaking over decades. This study 
identified three advocacy coalitions—the Free-Market, Egalitarian, and University 
Coalitions—that affected higher education finance policymaking in Texas. This study 
found that when one coalition dominates a policy subsystem, it is in the interest of the other 
coalitions to find common ground with the dominant coalition where possible and to 
collaborate with each other to check the dominant coalition. 
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Chapter 3 
The Effects of Student Grant Aid on Education and Workforce 
Outcomes during and after College 
Approximately 1.8 million first-time undergraduate students enrolled each year in 
a four-year college during the previous two decades. Approximately 40 percent of these 
students dropped out before earning their degree (Dunlop Velez, 2014). In a survey of 
students who left college without a degree, the top reason they gave for dropping out was 
having unmet financial need. Sixty percent of students who did not graduate reported that 
combining work and school in their first year in college was "too stressful" (Johnson & 
Rochkind, 2009). These students wanted to earn a college education. Many put forth great 
effort in juggling school and work. Yet they fell short in financing a human capital 
investment that would have increased their expected lifetime earnings by approximately 
$865,18314 had they gone from having some college to completing a bachelor’s degree 
(Day & Newburger, 2002).  
This represents a market failure that calls for a public policy solution. One policy 
solution to address this problem has been grant aid that balances eligibility criteria based 
on financial need with past academic achievement (often referred to as merit).  
Starting in 1989, states in the south and southwestern regions of the United States 
began experimenting with grant programs that struck different balances between need and 
academic criteria. Louisiana, the first of these states, created a grant aid program in 1989 
that was mostly based on need but would later be changed to merit-based (Russell, 2016). 
By 2014, 11 state grant programs combined need and merit criteria, another 32 state grant 
                                               
14 All dollars presented in this study represent 2016 dollars, based on the Consumer Price Index, All Urban 
Consumers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017). 
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programs were based solely on need, while another 20 were solely based on a student’s 
prior academic achievement (“45th Annual Survey Report on State-Sponsored Student 
Financial Aid 2013-2014 Academic Year,” 2014; “50-State Policy Database,” 2015).  
Theoretical Framework 
This study relied on the economic theory of human capital investment developed 
by Becker (1962). This theory asserts that individuals decide on pursuing additional 
education (in the case of this study, college students decide on continuing their education) 
based on their expectations of the relative benefits and costs produced by additional 
education. If a student expects the net benefit of another semester or year of college to be 
positive, the student will pursue the additional unit of education. The student revisits the 
decision after acquiring each marginal increase of education.  
Based on this economic theory, we would expect grant aid to facilitate college 
completion through four mechanisms. First, grant aid reduces the direct cost of college, 
thereby increasing the net benefit of college and preference for college. Second, for college 
students with financial need, the population of interest of this study, grant aid reduces the 
amount of time needed to work while enrolled in college, thereby providing the grant-aid 
awardee more free time.  Time not spent working while in college, increases the preference 
for college because the freed time can be used to improve a student’s academic 
performance, making academic achievement easier. The freed time can also be spent on 
other activities that reduce the stress associated with college, once again increasing the 
preference of college. Third, time freed up because of grant aid can also be used to enroll 
in more courses per semester, thereby shortening a student’s time to degree and reducing 
the opportunity cost of deferred work due to college. 
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We would also expect grant aid to reduce the need for student debt. And, because 
students with financial need face credit limits and may also have a limited tolerance for 
debt, grant aid would increase the share of students pursuing graduate degrees following 
their undergraduate education. Grant aid would also increase the likelihood of graduate 
education by increasing the share of students completing a bachelor’s degree.  
Finally, the economic theory of human capital investment asserts a student’s 
decision to acquire additional education increases their productivity and therefore the 
student’s future earnings. 
This study tested the above theoretical implications for grant aid by answering the 
following research questions. (1) Did receiving an initial TEXAS Grant increase 
persistence? (2) Did receiving an initial TEXAS Grant increase course enrollment? (3) Did 
receiving an initial TEXAS Grant reduce the need for employment while in college? (4) 
Did receiving an initial TEXAS Grant increase the share of students earning a bachelor’s 
degree? (5) Did receiving an initial TEXAS Grant decrease time to degree? (6) Did 
receiving an initial TEXAS Grant increase the share of students earning graduate degrees? 
(7) Did receiving an initial TEXAS Grant decrease student loans or other types of aid, 
respectively? (8) Did receiving an initial TEXAS Grant increase student earnings post 
college? 
Literature Review 
Empirical research of student grant aid has affirmed the theoretical implications of 
human capital investment theory identified above15. Existing research has found that grant 
                                               
15I used the online Scout search engine at the library system at University of Texas at Austin, the databases 
of Academic Search Complete, Education Source, ERIC, and the Google Scholar search engine. I searched 
for articles published in peer-reviewed journals and dissertations that included the terms university, college, 
or higher education and grant aid. I limited my search to the last twenty-five years of published research 
addressing grant aid in US. 
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aid positively affects student outcomes that lead to degree completion: college enrollment, 
persistence in college, credit accumulation, and grade point average (GPA). It has also 
found that grant aid reduces time spent working while enrolled in college, increases degree 
completion, and shortens time to degree. (Bettinger, 2004; Curs & Harper, 2012; Chen & 
DesJardins, 2008, 2010; DesJardins, McCall, Ott, & Kim, 2010; DesJardins & McCall, 
2010; Dynarski, 2002; Deming & Dynarski, 2009). 
I conducted a meta-analysis that found that grant aid of $1,000 increases bachelor’s 
degree completion rates within 11 years by 0.46 percentage points. This meta-analysis 
relied on six unique studies that used quasi-experimental methods to estimate grant aid 
effects. Table B1 describes the data and methodology of the meta-analysis (Alon, 2005; 
Alon, 2007; Bettinger, Gurantz, Kawano, & Sacerdote, 2016; Castleman & Long, 2013; 
Dynarski, 2008; Goldrick-Rab, Kelchen, Harris, & Bensen, 2016; Scott-Clayton, 2011; 
Scott-Clayton & Zafar, 2016).  
Research has also found that grant aid effects vary across different subgroups of 
students. Overall, those who realized greater benefits from grant aid include Hispanic and 
Black students, students with lower high school grade point averages, and students from 
families of lower income. (Alon, 2007, 2011; Bettinger et al, 2016; Chen & DesJardins, 
2008, 2010; Chen & St. John, 2011; S. Dynarski, 2008; Paulsen & St. John, 2002; Singell 
Jr., 2004; Schwartz, 1985). These findings have suggested that grant aid that weights need-
based criteria more than merit-based criteria may produce larger effect sizes.  
Finally, a few recent studies have found that grant aid affects longer-term 
educational and workforce outcomes and that these longer-term impacts may be larger than 
shorter term outcomes such as bachelor’s degree completion. Scott-Clayton and Zafar 
(2016) found that the merit-based grant program in West Virginia caused a three to four 
percentage point increase in the probability of earning a graduate degree after 10 years 
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from first enrolling in college. The grant program also produced positive effects on 
earnings that were considered meaningful though not statistically significant. Bettinger, 
Gurantz, Kawano, and Sacerdote (2016) found similar results in their study of a state-
funded merit-based grant program in California. They found that grant aid for low-GPA 
students increased graduate degree attainment by 6.1 percentage points and increased 
income by approximately 4.7 percent. 
Contribution of this study 
This study contributed to the existing literature by examining new data, using a 
natural experimental method, and answering questions that few researchers have 
investigated. It examined grant aid effects in the largest state yet studied, Texas. Texas’s 
size and diversity provided a sample that allowed for the investigation of more precise 
questions and the estimation of more precise results. This study used a regression 
discontinuity research design to evaluate grant aid effects. In addition to college persistence 
and graduation, it examined the scarcely studied grant effects on outcomes of employment 
while in college, employment post college, and graduate degree attainment16. It also 
examined how state-funded grant aid reduces student debt and supplants other types of 
financial aid.  
TEXAS GRANTS PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 
In 1999, the Texas legislature established the Towards Excellence, Access and 
Success (TEXAS) grant program with the passage of House Bill 713. Starting with an 
initial investment of $38 million in fiscal year 2000, the legislature increased TEXAS Grant 
funding, reaching $367 million in fiscal year 2015. Yet, only 57 percent of those who 
                                               
16 Course credit earned and grade point average were not examined due to data limitations. Texas 
colleges began reporting these variables in the fall of 2012. Officials at the Texas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board considered the first two years of these data to be unreliable. 
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applied for financial aid and who were eligible for a TEXAS Grant received one during the 
study period (General Appropriations Acts of 1999 and 2013).  
A student who received an initial TEXAS Grant was guaranteed to have their tuition 
and mandatory fees covered by a combination of state and university funds in their first 
year. After the first year, awardees were required to demonstrate sufficient academic 
progress and ongoing financial need. Students lost their TEXAS Grant eligibility if their 
college GPA dropped below a 2.5, if they earned less than 24 semester credit hours (SCH) 
per year, if they failed to earn credit in 70 percent of their enrolled classes, or if their 
Estimated Family Contribution (EFC) rose above $4,000. As shown in Figure B5, initial 
TEXAS Grant awardees maintained their grant at declining rates with each year in college. 
In year two, 63 percent of initial awardees maintained their award. This figure dropped to 
33 percent in year three, 23 percent in year four, and 9 percent in year five.    
EFC is a score defined by the US Department of Education that determines a 
student’s eligibility for federal financial aid and other financial aid programs such as 
TEXAS Grants. It is intended to represent a relative measure of what a family can 
contribute to pay for a family member’s college education. EFC was a function of 
numerous factors including the annual household income reported to the IRS, family net 
worth, the number of household dependents, the number of household dependents enrolled 
in college, and the costs of college enrollment of all family members enrolled in college. 
An EFC of $4,000 represented a family of two parents and two children, one of which was 
in college, with a $60,000 household income. 
To qualify for a TEXAS Grant, students were required to meet the following 
criteria: (1) hold Texas residency; (2) earn a high school diploma classified as college 
preparatory (in public schools their formal names are Recommended and the more rigorous 
Distinguished diplomas); (3) enroll in college within 16 months of high school graduation; 
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(4) enroll in at least 9 semester credit hours of college courses; (5) complete a financial aid 
application; and (6) have an EFC of $4,000 or less.  
DATA 
I analyzed data from a state longitudinal data system administered by the University 
of Texas at Austin. In 2013, the legislature passed legislation creating the current state 
longitudinal data system (House Bill 2103 by Villarreal) to align education research with 
state priorities. The legislation required the participation of Texas Education Agency 
(TEA), the Coordinating Board, and the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC). The 
administrative data included student-level data of all Texas public school students, student-
level data of all public and private college students, and person-level data of all employees 
working for a Texas employer. Data described the academic and workforce experience of 
students and their demographic and family background. 
This investigation’s study sample included students who enrolled in a Texas public 
university for the first time in the fall semesters of 2004 to 2013. The study sample was 
further restricted to students who met all the eligibility requirements for receiving a 
TEXAS Grant other than the financial need criterion defined by the $4,000 EFC cap. The 
$4,000 EFC cutoff point allowed for a fuzzy regression discontinuity research design.  
Table B2 summarizes pretreatment covariates of an unrestricted and restricted 
sample of the study population, respectively. The restricted sample was limited to students 
who had an EFC between $2,600 and $5,400, a bandwidth approximately equal to most 
bandwidths used in this analysis. The unrestricted and restricted samples consist of 358,226 
and 38,571 unique students, respectively. The means of pretreatment covariates are nearly 
identical across the two groups except for EFC. 
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This study relied on earnings data collected by TWC through the state 
unemployment insurance program. This data allowed for the investigation of student 
employment outside of work-study aid. Work-study aid was excluded from earnings 
because it was considered unique from other types of employment. Work-study aid was 
associated with work that was related to academics and took place on campus. Existing 
research has found work-study aid to produce positive effects on persistence and degree 
completion (DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2002), while working in general has been 
found to have a negative effect (Johnson & Rochkind, 2009). As a result, this study 
investigated grant aid effects on earnings net of work-study aid.  
Data limitations were found with unemployment insurance earnings data. The State 
of Texas collected wage data only for workers who were employed by Texas employers. 
Consequently, the study sample excluded students who found employment outside of 
Texas, who were self-employed, or who were employed by the US federal government. 
The Coordinating Board estimated the size of this excluded group to be 27 percent of Texas 
college graduates (Education Pays for Texas, 2016). This data limitation may have biased 
effect estimates if students in the quasi-treatment group experienced employment and 
earning levels outside the state of Texas, with the federal government, or as self-employed 
different from their counterparts in the quasi-control group. The direction of the bias was 
not clear because of the different categories of workers that were excluded from the study. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
I used a fuzzy regression discontinuity (fuzzy RD) research design to identify the 
impact of TEXAS Grants. As illustrated in the panel subtitled “% Treated” in Figure B2, 
the probability of treatment dropped from approximately 59 percent to 14 percent at the 
EFC cutoff point of $4,000. This was a steep drop, but was not a drop from 100 to zero 
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percent, as a sharp RD design would require. Sharp discontinuity was not present for two 
reasons. First, the program was not fully funded. Thus, fewer than 100 percent of eligible 
students received funding. Second, the Coordinating Board allowed for administrative 
discretion in some cases where extenuating circumstances caused a student’s EFC to not 
accurately reflect a family’s ability to contribute to the student’s college costs. As a result, 
individual financial aid offices exercised their administrative discretion and allowed 
approximately seven percent of students with an EFC greater than $4,000 and less than 
$5,400 to receive a TEXAS Grant. This administrative discretion had the potential to 
violate the RD assumption of local randomization at the cutoff point; however, I performed 
tests that determined this assumption was not violated. A more detailed explanation of 
these tests follows in the Methodology section. 
This study estimated average treatment effects on the treated (TOT). I choose to 
study TOT effects to answer concerns about current spending and to make inferences about 
the potential net benefit of covering all eligible participants near the EFC cap. 
The treatment variable (D) was a dummy variable indicating whether a student 
received an initial TEXAS Grant award at matriculation, rather than a measure of dosage, 
such as the total value of grant aid in dollars or years of tuition covered. Dosage was not 
used because the variance in doses received was partly endogenous. A student received 
more grant aid partially based on financial need and partially based on the student’s 
ongoing academic performance in college as described earlier. Thus, students with large 
amounts of grant aid were more likely to have higher levels of academic achievement 
relative to those with lower grant aid. 
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METHODOLOGY 
I estimated TOT effect sizes by using an instrumental variable regression analysis 
of linear probability models. I chose not to use logistic or probit models to ease the 
interpretation of results. The linear probability models estimated had limited risk of 
producing results outside of the zero to 100 percent probability distribution range because 
expected means were found in the middle of the range where the probability distribution 
is nearly linear in shape (von Hippel, 2015).  
My approach included a treatment and outcome equation as shown below in 
Equation B1 and B2, respectively. 
 𝐷+ 	= 	𝛼> + 𝛼2𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒+ + 𝛼B𝐸𝐹𝐶+ + 𝛼E𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒+ ∙ 𝐸𝐹𝐶+ + 𝜖+												(𝐵1) 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒+ 	= 		 𝛽> + 𝛽2𝐷KL + 𝛽B𝐸𝐹𝐶+ + 𝛽E𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒+ ∙ 𝐸𝐹𝐶+ +	𝜖+								(𝐵2) 
 
In Equation B1, Di was a dummy variable indicating that student i received a 
TEXAS Grant at the start of college (year one). In Equation B1 and B2, Eligiblei was a 
dummy variable that indicates whether student i met the financial need criteria in year one, 
an EFC at or below $4,000. EFCi represented student i’s Estimated Family Contribution 
centered at the cutoff point of $4,000. The interaction of Eligiblei and EFCi allowed the 
slope of the relationship between EFC and each outcome to vary on either side of the EFC 
cutoff. The variable 𝜖+ represented an error term for student i. 
In Equation B2, Outcomei was one of 10 sets of outcomes studied in this paper. In 
order of a student’s journey through college and beyond, Outcomei represented the 
following variables: (1) amount of other types of financial aid received in the first year of 
college; (2) a dummy for persisting from a prior year to year two, three, and four post 
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college entry, respectively; (3) a dummy for persisting for four years without interrupting 
annual college enrollment; (4) annual amount of university semester credit hours enrolled 
(SCH) in year one, two, three, and four post college entry, respectively; (5) a dummy for 
earning a bachelor’s degree within four, five, six, seven, and eight years post college entry 
from a Texas private or public university, respectively; (6) a dummy for earning a graduate 
degree within six, seven, eight, nine, and ten years post college entry from a Texas public 
or private university, respectively; (7) October to March earnings (net of work-study aid) 
in year one, two, three, and four post college entry, respectively; (8) a dummy for being 
employed (outside of federal work-study aid) in year one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, 
eight, nine, and ten post college entry, respectively; (9), annual earnings (net of work-study 
aid) in years 1 through 10 post college entry, respectively; and (10) total student debt.  𝐷KL  represented a student’s predicted probability of treatment. The estimated effect 
of treatment was represented by 𝛽2.   
Standard errors in Equation B1 and B2 were clustered by cohort and the college the 
student first enrolled. 
I tested hypotheses using a two-sided t-test. In the tables that detail effect sizes, I 
flagged statistical significance at levels below .1, .05, .01, and .001, respectively. 
VALIDATING RD ASSUMPTIONS 
The internal validity of fuzzy RD rested on the requirement that students or their 
agents lacked precise control over their estimated family contribution (EFC). To verify 
this, I interviewed financial aid administrators about the process of calculating EFC. They 
confirmed that students and their parents are unable to influence this federally defined 
metric with precision. 
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I also performed two statistical tests for local randomization. I first conducted the 
McCrary test, a test for manipulation of the score variable around the cutoff point. I found 
no evidence of manipulation. As illustrated in Figure B1, the discontinuity estimate equaled 
0.012 with a standard error of 0.026. A visual inspection of the density function of EFC 
revealed no bunching to the left of the EFC cutoff point.  
I then ran a second statistical test for discontinuity in pretreatment covariates. As 
recommended by Lee and Lemieux (2010), I estimated a system of Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression equations that regressed the pretreatment covariates on treatment eligibility 
(ELIGi) and the score variable (EFCi). Equation B3 represented this system of equations, 
where k represented each of the 14 pretreatment covariates. 
 𝑍O+ = 𝛽O> + 𝛽O2𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒+ + 𝛽OB𝐸𝐹𝐶+ + 𝜖O+																																																												(𝐵3)  
 
I then ran a chi-square test of the joint hypothesis: ß11 = ß21… = ßk1 = 0. It produced 
a p-value of 0.47, allowing me not to reject the hypothesis of covariate continuity at the 
cutoff point.  
A final verification of the assumption of local randomization was conducted by 
visually inspecting the probability distributions of the pretreatment covariates conditioned 
on EFC. As shown in Figure B1, a sample of pretreatment covariates displayed no 
discontinuity at the cutoff point. 
BANDWIDTH SELECTION 
An important task in this regression discontinuity design involved defining the 
neighborhood of observations to the left and right of the cutoff point that would be included 
in the estimation process. I used the widely accepted Mean Squared Error-optimal 
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bandwidth method (MSE) first developed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) to 
accomplish this task. An optimal bandwidth was estimated for each outcome.  
RESULTS 
Other Student Aid in First Year of College 
This study found that universities supplant other types of financial aid with TEXAS 
Grant dollars when students receive their first grant award. Receiving an initial TEXAS 
Grant reduced a student’s amount of other grant aid and work-study aid in year one by 
$631 and $107, respectively, as shown in Table B3. 
Students also used TEXAS Grant dollars to replace student loan dollars. Receiving 
a TEXAS Grant caused students to reduce their student loan dollars in year one by $2,493, 
as shown in Table B3. This continued year to year. Ultimately, receiving an initial TEXAS 
Grant caused students to reduce their total student debt by $6,500. This was a reduction in 
student debt of 24 percent relative to the control group’s average student debt of $27,373.  
TEXAS Grant effects on other funding sources resulted in relieving financial 
constraints of awardees not by $6,938 but $3,707 in year one. 
Given that a TEXAS Grant covers all tuition and fees, an average value of $6,938 
per year for up to five years, we would have expected TEXAS Grants to have a larger 
impact on student debt. However, as described above, its financial impact was significantly 
reduced by a high level of attrition in TEXAS Grant renewal awards. As shown in Figure 
B5, only 63 percent of initial awardees renewed their grant in year two. This figure dropped 
to 33 percent in year three, 23 percent in year four, and 9 percent in year five.  
Enrollment and Persistence  
Receiving an initial TEXAS Grant produced no statistically significant effect on 
persistence conditioned on enrollment in the prior year. However, it produced an impact 
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on continuous annual enrollment for the first four years of college. Receiving an initial 
TEXAS Grant increased the probability of continuous enrollment through year four by 5.4 
percentage points, as shown in Table B3. 
TEXAS Grant aid produced a positive effect on semester credit hours enrolled 
(SCH)17, but not at a statistically significant level until year three and four of college. As 
summarized in Table B3, receiving a TEXAS Grant increased cumulative course 
enrollment by 2.84 SCH in year three and 5.2 SCH in year four. 
Working while Enrolled in College 
Receiving an initial TEXAS Grant reduced the amount of time students spent 
employed outside of work-study aid in the first year of college. As shown in Table B3, 
receiving an initial TEXAS Grant reduced earnings from October to March by $402 in year 
one and $450 in year two. These effects represented negative growth rates of 30 percent 
and 18 percent relative to expected control group earnings, respectively. 
Bachelor’s Degree Completion 
Receiving an initial TEXAS Grant caused students to graduate sooner and increased 
the overall completion rate. As illustrated in Figure B6 and outlined in Table B3, initial 
TEXAS Grant awardees completed college at levels higher than their control group 
counterparts. The grant effect size peaked at the five-year graduation rate then declined as 
more control-group students graduated with each passing year. Grant aid effects were 5.80, 
9.56, 6.73, 6.14, and 3.13 percentage points for completion by year four, five, six, seven, 
and eight post college entry, respectively. Effects were statistically significant at five, six, 
and seven years post college entry and marginally statistically significant at four years post 
                                               
17 The Higher Education Coordinating Board did not begin collecting data on credit hours earned until 
2012. 
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college entry. The loss of statistical significance in the eight-year graduation rate was likely 
due to a declining sample size and declining statistical power. Statistical significance was 
not reached with effect sizes less than five percentage points. 
The magnitude of grant effects on degree completion were meaningful when 
compared to graduation rates of the control group. Receiving an initial TEXAS Grant 
freshmen year increased graduation rates relative to the control group by 18.2, 17.2, 10.8, 
9.3, and 4.7 percent, respectively. 
Annual Work and Earnings  
Receiving an initial TEXAS Grant produced no statistically significant effects on 
the probability of employment during any quarter of years one to ten post college entry, as 
shown in Table B3. However, in general, effect signs were negative during the expected 
college years and positive post expected college graduation. A similar pattern emerged 
with grant effects on annual earnings. 
In general, students who received an initial TEXAS Grant exhibited a negative 
effect on annual earnings during college, but a positive effect post expected college 
graduation, as shown in Table B3. Receiving an initial TEXAS Grant decreased annual 
earnings by $617 in year one and increased annual earnings by $1,961 in year five post 
college entry. These effects were marginally statistically significant. All others were not.   
Graduate Degree 
Receiving an initial TEXAS Grant caused students to increase their likelihood of 
earning a graduate degree by 4.6 and 6.3 percentage points in year nine and ten post college 
entry, as shown in Table B3. These effects represented relative growth rates of 51 and 65 
percent from the expected graduate degree attainment rate of the control group in year nine 
and year ten post college entry, respectively.  
 58 
Robustness Checks 
I conducted two robustness checks. The first tested whether grant aid effects were 
sensitive to changes in the bandwidth. I performed this test by repeating the estimation 
process after making 10-percent incremental changes to the MSE-optimal bandwidth. As 
shown in Table B4, the general relationship between receiving an initial TEXAS Grant and 
student outcomes did not change as the bandwidth varied from 50 to 150 percent of its 
original size. Although effect sizes changed, the sign and general statistical significance 
did not. 
Second, I tested whether the functional form of the score variable (EFCi) in relation 
to each outcome was suitably represented by a linear functional form. I followed a 
procedure recommended by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) that involved repeating the 
estimation process with a quadratic functional form of the score variable and then checking 
to see whether the polynomial terms were statistically significant. As shown in Table B7, 
the use of a linear functional form of EFC, the score variable, was not invalidated in any 
of the models. 
DISCUSSION 
The findings support the expectations derived from the economic theory of human 
capital investment. Grant aid lowers the cost of continuing a college student’s education, 
thereby increasing the student’s preference and ability to complete a bachelor’s degree. 
This study finds that a key mechanism that causes this result is grant aid’s effect on time 
spent working while enrolled in college.  
An initial TEXAS Grant causes the average student to spend less time working 
during the first two years of college. Based on a minimum wage of eight dollars per hour, 
these effects translate to 50 and 56 fewer hours spent working from October to March in 
year one and two, respectively. If we apply these effects to the entire academic year, the 
 59 
effect of an initial TEXAS Grant on hours employed is 75 and 84 fewer hours in a student’s 
first and second academic year, respectively. This is a significant amount of time that can 
be used to study for classes, enroll in more classes, or engage in campus life or other 
activities that make college enjoyable.  Moreover, the grant effect on bachelor’s degree 
completion is similar in other states. 
The convention in grant aid impact studies is to express the impact on bachelor’s 
degree graduation rates per $1,000 of grant aid. Following this convention, TEXAS Grants 
produces an impact on bachelor’s degree completion per $1,000 of 0.50 percentage points 
by year eight post college entry. This estimate is approximately equal to the estimate 
derived by the meta-analysis, as shown in Table B1. In the meta-analysis, $1,000 of grant 
aid causes an increase in bachelor’s degree completion within 11 years equal to 0.46 
percentage points18.  
TEXAS Grant’s effect on annual earnings is negative during expected college years 
and positive post expected college graduation but with mostly non-statistically significant 
effect sizes. What explains this pattern of effects on earnings? 
The negative effects during the college years are the result of grant aid substituting 
for earnings from employment. The substitution effect becomes clear after removing the 
quarters that overlap the summer months and focusing on the fourth and first quarter of 
calendar year. The effects are also strongest in year one and two when most awardees are 
receiving grant aid. 
The positive effects on earnings post college are weak likely for two reasons. First, 
TEXAS Grants causes three to six percent more college students to complete college. Its 
                                               
18 The meta-analysis found significant heterogeneity in the studies analyzed. Therefore, the weighted 
average effect size should be considered a baseline estimate for comparison purposes, not a reflection of an 
underlying general effect of grant aid. 
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larger effect for the awardees group relative to the control group is on shortening their time 
to degree by one to two years on average. Consequently, effects on earnings post college 
primarily represent a comparison between two groups of college with one having one to 
two more years of work experience. Second, receiving an initial TEXAS Grant increases 
the likelihood students return to school to earn a graduate degree by year nine and ten post 
college entry. This explains why we see the effect on earnings begin to decline in year six, 
reach a low point in year eight, then rise and reach its largest effect size in year 10.  
Receiving an initial TEXAS Grant increases the likelihood of earning a graduate 
degree by 6.3 percentage points by year 10 from college entry. This represents a growth of 
65 percent relative to the control group’s expected outcome of 9.7 percentage points. This 
is a tremendous boost in graduate degree attainment for students from low-income families. 
This finding is affirmed by the impact studies of the West Virginia Promise Scholarship 
(Scott-Clayton & Zafar, 2016) and Cal Grants (Bettinger, Gurantz, Kawano, & Sacerdote, 
2016). The merit-based West Virginia Promise Scholarship increased graduate degree 
completion by three to four percentage points by year 10 post college entry, while Cal 
Grants improved graduate degree attainment for a low-GPA study sample by 6.1 
percentage points.  
Future research with data that follow students after year 10 should examine how 
the TEXAS Grant effect on graduate degree attainment improves earnings.  
In conclusion, states seeking to raise their educational attainment rates and raise 
earnings should advance policies that reduce the cost of college for students who have 
demonstrated prior academic readiness but lack the financial resources to pay for college. 
Need-based grant programs that include merit-criteria like TEXAS Grants are an effective 
and cost-efficient policy tool for lowering the price of college for students who need help. 
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Chapter 4 
The Effects of Dual Credit on Secondary and Postsecondary Student 
Outcomes 
Education remains one of the most salient policy levers to promote economic self-
sufficiency for individuals, their families, and the communities where they reside. 
Furthermore, our technology-driven global economy is making human capital development 
increasingly necessary for individuals and nations. By 2020, acquiring a postsecondary 
certificate or degree will be a requirement for nearly two-thirds of all jobs in the United 
States. Moreover, the benefits of postsecondary education are most crucial for large, 
diverse states like Texas where the fastest-growing segment of the population is young, 
economically disadvantaged, and from communities historically underserved by higher 
education institutions (Carnevale, 2013; Murdock et al., 2014).  
Dual-credit programs were created as a strategy for increasing college readiness 
and access. Dual-credit courses have allowed eligible high school students to enroll in 
college-level courses and simultaneously earn college and high school credit. Dual-credit 
programs, also referred to as dual enrollment or concurrent enrollment, were created in the 
1980’s through local agreements between school districts and their local four-year or two-
year colleges.  
States created statewide dual-credit policies to promote access to and quality of 
dual-credit courses. More recently, local communities and states like Texas have adopted 
dual-credit programs to close educational achievement gaps between low-income students 
and their higher-income counterparts. Currently, all 50 states in the US have adopted dual-
credit policies, with nearly 85 percent of all public high schools having enrolled students 
in dual-credit programs during the 2010-2011 academic year (Taylor, et al., 2015). 
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In Texas, where the study population of this investigation was drawn, there were 
two types of dual credit: academic dual credit and career and technology education (CTE) 
dual credit. Academic dual credit applied toward a certificate, associate, and bachelor’s 
degree. High school students were eligible to participate in academic dual credit if they 
were classified as college-ready based on their performance on certain standardized 
exams19. CTE dual credit applied only to community college certificate programs and did 
not require students to be considered college-ready. In Texas, academic dual credit made 
up 85 percent of all dual credit earned during the study period. This study focused on the 
effects of academic dual credit on postsecondary outcomes. Hereafter, this paper refers to 
academic dual credit simply as dual credit.   
Unlike Advanced Placement courses (AP), dual-credit courses resulted in college 
credit upon satisfactory completion of the course. AP courses resulted in college credit only 
if the student took an AP exam corresponding to their AP course and achieved a certain 
exam score. Students had to register to take an AP exam separate from their class 
registration and pay an additional fee.  
Unlike dual credit, the College Board has developed a system for maintaining a 
national standard of quality associated with AP courses. It has created standardized 
curriculum for AP classes and college-credit exams. The College Board has also provided 
professional development for AP teachers.  
Theoretical Framework 
This study applied the economic theory of human capital investment developed by 
Becker (1962) to understanding dual credit. This theory asserts that individuals decide on 
pursuing additional education (in the case of this study, high school students decide on 
                                               
19 The standardized exams that determined college-readiness in Texas include the SAT, ACT, the Texas 
Success Initiative exam, and certain state-mandated high school exams.  
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continuing their education into college) based on their expectations of the relative benefits 
and costs produced by the additional education. If students expect the net benefit of 
additional education to be positive, they will pursue additional education and revisit this 
decision after acquiring each additional unit of education. This theory has many 
implications for dual credit. 
Dual credit can be understood to facilitate college access and completion through 
five mechanisms. First, dual credit reduces the direct cost of college by allowing students 
to earn college credit for free or at a reduced rate, as most dual-credit programs are 
subsidized either by a student’s school district or low-cost community college. Second, 
dual credit reduces the opportunity cost of foregone wages associated with postsecondary 
education because students acquire a head start on earning college credits before high 
school graduation. Third, dual-credit participation provides students valuable information 
to support their decision to enroll in college by allowing them to assess their ability to 
complete college-level coursework and develop an interest in college subjects. Fourth, dual 
credit can increase students’ preferences for college by teaching them college-level study 
skills and advancing their intellectual development. Fifth, dual credit can also increase 
students’ preferences for college by delivering knowledge about how college operates, 
including college enrollment systems, campuses, and classrooms.  
We can expect the first two mechanisms to produce a dosage effect because the 
cost of college decreases with each increase in dual credit earned. As a result, each 
additional dual credit earned increases the likelihood of college enrollment and completion. 
The last three mechanisms reduce the uncertainty of being college-ready. We can expect 
these mechanisms to have decreasing marginal benefits. This is because once students are 
aware of their college-readiness and knowledge about how college operates there are few 
if any more benefits to gain in this regard. 
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Other consequences of dual credit include effects on timely high school graduation 
and university admissions. If the benefits of a college education become more accessible 
because of dual-credit participation, as described above, student preferences for timely high 
school graduation increase. Dual credit on a student’s high school transcript can also 
increase the likelihood that a university admits a student based on the economic theory of 
signaling (Spence, 1973; Weiss, 1995)20. If dual-credit participation is a signal of college-
readiness (an indicator of proactive academic preparation and personal determination) to 
offices of university admissions, then increases in dual-credit participation can lead to 
increases in college admissions.   
Finally, as college tuition and fees increase, demand for dual credit will increase. 
Literature Review 
Eight previous studies used advanced quantitative methods to estimate dual credit’s 
impact on student outcomes21. They found that dual credit improves rates of high school 
graduation, college enrollment, college persistence, college GPA, and college degree 
completion. Those that estimated dual-credit dosage effects also found that enrolling in 
more dual credit increased the likelihood of college enrollment and completion (Allen and 
Dadgar, 2012; An, 2013; Hughes, 2016; Giani et al., 2016; Karp et al., 2007; Speroni, 2011; 
Swanson, 2008).  
                                               
20 The signaling value of education is an economic theory that asserts that part of the value of education is 
based on its ability to signal to decision makers, such as employers (or, in this study, offices of university 
admission) that a person who has achieved a certain education is more likely to possess traits desired by the 
decision maker.  
21 I used the online Scout search engine of the library system at University of Texas at Austin, the 
databases of Academic Search Complete, Education Source, ERIC, and the Google Scholar search engine. I 
searched for articles published in peer-reviewed journals and dissertations that included the following 
terms: dual credit, concurrent enrollment, postsecondary impact, college impact, postsecondary effects, 
college effects, high school graduation, college enrollment, and college graduation. I limited my search to 
research addressing dual credit in US. 
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Dual credit was also found to vary in its effect on degree completion by subject 
matter. Academic subjects such as English, math, social sciences, science and foreign 
languages produced larger effects on postsecondary degree completion (associate or 
bachelor’s degree) than non-core courses such as computer science, health, and art. Math 
dual credit was also found to produce larger effect sizes on degree completion than other 
core dual-credit subjects (Giani et al., 2016; Speroni, 2011).  
With few exceptions, studies found that the effects of dual credit on college 
enrollment and degree completion were greatest for socioeconomically disadvantaged 
students (An, 2013; Karp, et al., 2007). One study by Speroni (2011) found that dual credit 
increased four-year college enrollment more for minority students but did not produce an 
effect on postsecondary enrollment (an outcome that combined two-year and four-year 
college enrollment) in general. This suggested that dual credit induced students to enroll in 
four-year colleges who otherwise would have enrolled in two-year colleges.  
Two existing studies reviewed compared dual credit to other types of college 
preparatory classes including Advanced Placement (AP). Giani et al. (2016) found that 
dual-credit courses produced larger effect sizes than advanced high school courses (non-
AP) on most postsecondary outcomes examined, including bachelor’s degree completion 
rates. Speroni (2011) tested the effect size differences between dual credit and AP on 
postsecondary enrollment (enrollment in a two-year or four-year college) and on 
enrollment in a four-year college. She found that dual credit increased postsecondary 
enrollment greater than AP, while AP increased four-year college enrollment greater than 
dual credit, all by statistically significant margins. She also found no statistically significant 
difference between AP and dual credit’s impact on bachelor’s degree attainment. 
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Contribution of this Study 
This study built on the existing research by using a larger study sample, using a 
different methodology for controlling for unobserved student and school attributes, and 
answering new questions.  
The study sample was the largest to date. This study followed 11 cohorts of more 
than three million students who enrolled in over one thousand school districts, from ninth 
grade in high school up to 13 years post high school entry. Furthermore, the student 
population studied was from a large and diverse state, Texas. 
This study contributed to the existing literature by using a school district-level 
fixed-effects analysis that emphasized the effects of dual credit as a policy. Previous 
studies individually compared students who did and did not enroll in dual credit, but a 
student’s choice to enroll in dual credit was potentially endogenous and may have produced 
biased effects if, say, students who already have clear college plans were more likely to 
enroll in dual credit. To address this weakness, my approach allowed each district to serve 
as its own control group, effectively controlling for time-invariant district-level 
confounding variables such as the socioeconomic and demographic composition of a 
district’s student body. This was an important consideration given Texas’ highly 
segregated public-school system (Frankenberg, 2013). 
This study also improved upon the existing research by including student outcomes 
unique to community colleges. This was an important contribution because community 
colleges have the most to gain from an evaluation of dual credit. They were the higher 
education partner in nearly all dual-credit programs in Texas and the primary provider in 
the US. They have the lowest degree completion rates of all higher education institutions. 
And, most high school graduates who attended college during the study period began at a 
community college. 
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This study was also the first to analyze dual-credit effects on university admissions, 
improving our understanding of the signaling value dual credit may produce in regard to 
university admissions. It followed students up to thirteen years from when they first enter 
high school to estimate dual-credit effects on graduate degree attainment. It explored 
dosage effects of dual credit to determine whether effect sizes plateau at higher levels of 
participation. And it furthered the comparative analysis between AP and dual credit by 
examining the dosage effects of each type of early college coursework. 
Finally, this study made new contributions to the study of dual-credit program 
design. This study investigated how dual-credit effect sizes varied across different program 
attributes, though endogeneity issues made these findings tentative. Specifically, this study 
explored whether dual-credit effects varied between English, math, science, social science, 
arts, foreign languages, computer science, and “other” subjects. For a limited set of shorter-
term outcomes (high school graduation, university application, university enrollment, and 
community college enrollment, associate degree completion), the study investigated 
whether instructors with a doctoral degree produced a different impact from those with a 
master’s degree; whether impacts varied by instruction mode (traditional face-to-face 
classroom instruction, instruction with teacher and students connected by video, computer-
based instruction, or a combination of computer and classroom instruction referred to as 
blended learning in this paper); and whether dual-credit courses located on a high school 
campus produced a different impact from those located on university or community college 
campuses.  
In summary, the research questions this study attempted to answer include the 
following: 
1. Did dual-credit participation cause more students to pursue a two- and four-year 
college degree, respectively? 
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2. Did dual-credit participation cause an increase in university admissions? 
3. Did dual-credit participation increase educational attainment levels, measured 
by increasing rates of high school graduation and associate, bachelor’s, and 
graduate degree attainment, respectively? 
4. Did dual-credit participation decrease time to degree for students pursuing an 
associate and bachelor’s degree, respectively? 
5. Did marginal increases in dual-credit participation produce positive marginal 
benefits – was more dual credit better?  
6. Were dual-credit effects on student outcomes larger than those produced by 
Advanced Placement (AP) courses? 
7. Did dual-credit effect sizes vary by course subject, mode of instruction, location 
of instruction, or instructor’s highest degree earned? 
POLICY BACKGROUND 
Dual-credit courses studied were the product of collaborations between school 
districts and colleges. In Texas, community colleges were the primary higher education 
sponsor of dual-credit programs.  These collaborations were created at the local level with 
limited state oversight, while other states maintain a state-level regulatory framework 
(Taylor, Borden & Park, 2015).   
There was great variety in dual-credit program design. In addition to varying by 
subject, dual-credit courses were taught within different settings (high school campus, 
community college campus, university campus, or other location such as a place of work, 
military facility, or correctional institution). They used different modes of instruction (face-
to-face instruction, video, computer-based content only, or a blend of online coursework 
and face-to-face instruction). And, they were instructed by teachers with a master’s degree 
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or doctorate. (Reporting and Procedures Manual Texas for Community, Technical, and 
State Colleges, 2016).  
Who taught dual-credit classes was a significant concern. Dual-credit instructors in 
Texas must hold either a master’s degree or a doctorate. University faculty and 
administrators have questioned the rigor of dual-credit courses, which are most commonly 
taught by instructors with a master’s degree only22.  
In 1995, the Texas legislature authorized community colleges to offer dual-credit 
programs in partnership with their local school districts by passing House Bill (HB) 1336. 
Though Texas was not an early adopter of dual-credit policy, it tried to catch up to other 
states. From 1995 to 2015, the legislature passed 20 bills incentivizing the creation of dual-
credit programs and removing barriers to increased enrollment and program expansion. For 
example, in 2003, the Texas legislature passed HB 415 to allow both school districts and 
colleges to be paid by the state for the provision of dual-credit instruction. Three years 
later, the Texas legislature passed HB 1, requiring all public high schools to provide 
students access to 12 semester credit hours (SCH) of college credit through AP, 
International Baccalaureate, or dual-credit courses. In 2015, the Texas legislature 
prohibited the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (Coordinating Board) from 
adopting rules that limit the total number of dual-credit courses a student could enroll in 
(HB 505). In the same session, the Texas legislature also removed regulations that limited 
colleges from providing dual credit outside of their service area.  
                                               
22 The popular press has documented this perspective on dual credit held by university administrators. The 
following quote about dual credit was one example. “In terms of the rigor of the community college 
programs, it is a little bit of a mixed bag,” [Jim Miller, Dean of Admissions at Brown University] said. “We 
know what an AP calculus class is. We're not sure what a calculus course is at the myriad community 
colleges” (Mellon, 2008). 
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Dual credit received bipartisan support from two advocacy coalitions, one 
dominated by Republican legislators who prioritized cost efficiencies in higher education 
and one dominated by Democratic legislators who prioritized college access and 
completion, particularly for low-income and minority students. Members of both coalitions 
promoted dual credit as a cost-efficient and egalitarian solution for raising educational 
attainment levels in the context of rising tuition rates and declining state funding for higher 
education.   
Dual credit was also popular with public school administrators and students. School 
districts offering dual credit grew from 75 percent in 2001 to 92 percent in 2011, as shown 
in Figure C1. Within dual-credit districts, student participation in dual credit grew from 16 
percent of the high school cohort who started high school in 2001 to 27 percent of the 2011 
cohort, as shown in Figure C2.   
Most important for this study, school districts adopted dual-credit policies at 
different times and experienced unique fluctuations in student participation in dual credit. 
It was this variation that permitted the identification of dual-credit effects. As shown in 
Table C1, only eight percent of school districts experienced consistent positive growth 
across time. School districts experienced fluctuations in dual-credit participation that 
varied from one to seven declines across 11 cohorts, with the largest share experiencing 
four declines. Furthermore, as shown in Figure C1, dual-credit adoption varied across 
major urban, major suburban, non-metropolitan, rural, charter, and other school districts 
by year. At districts that offered dual credit, student participation in dual credit also varied 
across these categories of school districts, as shown in Figure C2. 
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DATA 
This study analyzed data from the Education Research Center at the University of 
Texas at Austin (UT ERC). The UT ERC data used included student-level administrative 
data collected by the Texas Education Agency (TEA) and the Coordinating Board. The 
data described the secondary and postsecondary education of public school students who 
entered high school in academic years ending in 2001 to 2011. The data also described the 
demographics, household poverty status, and performance on state-required tests of 
students. 
The student population included in the analysis amounted to 3,321,366 public high 
school students who entered 2,554 high schools in 1,173 public school districts (district). I 
collapsed the student-level data into district-level data to form a data set of 1,173 unique 
districts with up to 11 student cohorts of data. I defined a cohort as the group of students 
who entered high school in the same year. As shown in Table C2, the pooled sample of 11 
district-level cohorts equaled 12,021 observations and varied by student demographics, 
performance on state-mandated test scores, and dual credit earned by program attributes. 
Data Limitations 
TEA and the Coordinating Board used separate systems to collect data describing 
student enrollment in dual credit. A study of the two systems found that approximately a 
quarter of TEA-identified dual-credit students were not identified as dual-credit students 
by the Coordinating Board, and vice versa. The systems also lacked a course “crosswalk” 
to link course data (Eklund, 2009). As a consequence, researchers that modeled the effects 
of dual credit in Texas had to choose between the two sources of dual-credit data. 
I chose to rely on TEA data to answer my primary research questions, questions 
one through six, because TEA data allowed me to account for AP credit earned. I used 
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Coordinating Board data to explore heterogeneous effects of dual credit by instruction 
mode and location, data absent from TEA data. 
A second data limitation was associated with the identification of heterogeneous 
effects by type of instructor, and teaching mode and location. As shown in Table C2, the 
observation counts associated with these variables was approximately one-fifth of the other 
variables. This was because the state of Texas did not begin collecting these variables until 
fiscal year 2012. As a result, heterogeneous effects by these attributes could only be 
examined for the 2008 cohort and for outcomes that occurred within two years from the 
cohort’s expected high school graduation. Consequently, the findings of heterogeneous 
effects were tentative. 
RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
Students voluntarily enrolled in dual credit. This posed a challenge to estimating 
the effects of dual credit unbiased by self-selection, as described earlier. For example, one 
would expect students with high aspirations for college to be more likely to enroll in dual 
credit and more likely to earn a college degree. Consequently, not controlling for the 
unobserved college aspirations of students would overstate dual-credit effects on college 
completion. 
This study addressed the presence of unobserved variables by using a panel 
regression with school district fixed effects and probability weights. Over multiple years, 
a set of explanatory and outcome variables were observed for each cohort of a district. A 
school district’s changes in dual-credit participation were then compared to its 
corresponding changes in student outcomes. With this within-district comparison, each 
school district served as its own control group over time. 
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School district fixed effects controlled for unobserved variables that do not vary 
with time, such as location and legal structure. It also controlled for much of the effects of 
attributes that, though not strictly time-invariant, were relatively stable across a decade, 
such as the socioeconomics of the student population, capital infrastructure, school culture, 
and the quality of faculty. 
Probability weights were included to ensure that each school district contributed to 
the identification of dual-credit effects in proportion to their student population. Probability 
weights were based on a school district’s average student population during the study 
period relative to the sum of average student populations of all districts.  
I chose to estimate the effect of dual credit as a school district (district) policy and 
not a school policy. I did so because district superintendents, not school principals, decided 
to enter into dual-credit partnerships with an institution of higher education. They were 
also the decision-makers with the authority and responsibility to increase dual-credit 
participation.   
A threat to the internal validity of this research design involved trends. If the 
treatment variable varied along a time pattern common to other plausible explanatory 
variables not accounted for, these omitted variables would bias estimated effect sizes. This 
study mitigated time trend threats by including a fixed effect for each year. Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier, this research design benefited from significant variance in dual-credit 
participation that fluctuated cohort to cohort within each school district. This variance 
mitigated time trend threats. 
A final threat to internal validity was district-specific trends. The statewide 
population of economically disadvantaged students grew by 10 percentage points from 49 
percent in 2001 to 59 percent in 2011. However, districts were declining in affluence at 
different rates and some were even growing in affluence. These district-specific trends 
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affected the likelihood of dual credit participation and expected postsecondary outcomes, 
thereby confounding the relationship between dual-credit participation and postsecondary 
outcomes. To mitigate this threat, this study controlled for changes in a district’s 
economically disadvantaged student population and changes in its race and ethnic 
composition by including corresponding covariates. 
This study analyzed the following student outcomes: (1) the percentage of students 
who graduated from high school within four years of entering high school; (2) the 
percentage of students who applied to a Texas public university (private school data was 
not available) before high school graduation; (3) the percentage admitted to a Texas public 
university before high school graduation (private school data was not available), (4) the 
percentage enrolled in a Texas public community college in the fifth year from entering 
high school (or the first year after the cohort’s expected high school graduation year); (5) 
the percentage enrolled in a Texas university (public or private) in the fifth year from 
entering high school; (6)  the percentage who earned an associate degree in Texas by the 
sixth year and (7) eighth year from entering high school; (8) the percentage who earned a 
bachelor’s degree in Texas within eight, (9) ten, and (10) twelve years from entering high 
school; and (11) the percentage who earned a graduate degree in Texas within twelve years 
and (12) thirteen years from entering high school. As described above, all outcomes 
occurred in years from when a cohort entered high school. Hereafter, any reference to when 
an outcome occurs was in relation to high school entry. 
This study answered its seven research questions by estimating six school district 
fixed effects regression equations using linear probability models. Linear probability 
models were used instead of logistic or probit models to ease the interpretation of results. 
The linear probability models estimated had limited risk of producing results outside of 
the zero to 100 percent probability distribution range because expected means were found 
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in the middle of the range where the probability distribution is nearly linear in shape (von 
Hippel, 2015).  
In the first model, I estimated an expected outcome for cohort i of district j (Yij) as 
 𝑌+R = 	𝛼+ + 𝜆R + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃+R + 𝜷𝟐𝒁𝒊𝒋 + 𝛽E𝐷𝐶+R + 𝜀+R																																																			(C1), 
 
where 𝛼+ was the cohort fixed effect of cohort i, 𝜆R was the district fixed effect of district 
j, DCij represented the share of students earning at least one dual credit of cohort i of district 
j, and APij represented the share of students earning credit in at least one AP course of 
cohort i of district j. The effect size of AP and dual-credit participation was represented by 
b1, and b3, respectively. Earning AP credit meant a student successfully completed an AP 
class, it did not necessarily mean a certain score was achieved on an AP test. 
Zij represented an array of time-varying attributes of cohort i of district j, including 
demographic and socioeconomic composition of the student body; share of immigrant 
students; and average scores of eighth-grade math and reading state-standardized exams 
(the grade before dual-credit eligibility), respectively. The error term of cohort i of district 
j was represented by 𝜀+R and was clustered by district to adjust for serial correlation of the 
errors across nearby years (Cameron & Miller, 2015). Equation C1 represented the basic 
model that all others are built on.  
In the second regression model, I examined the effects of changes in the average 
amount of dual credit and AP credit earned. These explanatory variables were different 
from those in the first model because they could be increased by having the existing pool 
of dual-credit students earn more dual credit. As described earlier, as students earned more 
dual credit, their likelihood of enrolling and graduating from college should have increased. 
The second model tested this hypothesis.  
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A district’s average amount of dual credit earned per cohort better accounted for 
dosage; however, it was an imperfect measure of dosage. This was because a given average 
could reflect many students earning few dual credit or few students earning many dual 
credits. Consequently, the correct interpretation of the effect size was from the district’s 
perspective. The effect of average dual credit earned represented what follows when a 
district increased the average dual credit earned in a given cohort.  
In the second model, I estimated an expected outcome for cohort i of district j (Yij) 
as 
 𝑌+R = 	𝛼+ + 𝜆R + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃_𝐷𝑂𝑆𝐸+R + 𝛽B𝐴𝑃_𝐷𝑂𝑆𝐸B+R  +𝜷𝟑𝒁𝒊𝒋+	𝛽\𝐷𝐶_𝐷𝑂𝑆𝐸+R+𝛽]𝐷𝐶_𝐷𝑂𝑆𝐸+RB + 𝜀+R,																																													(C2) 
 
where quadratic functional forms for average AP and dual credit earned for cohort i of 
district j replaced APij and DCij, and the remaining regressors from Equation C1 were 
included. I used a quadratic functional form in this model so that I could examine whether 
the effects of average dual credit plateaued or declined as average dual credit increased. b4 
and b5 measured the effect of a one-unit (equivalent to three SCH) increase in dual credit 
earned. b1 and b2 measured the effect of a one-unit (equivalent to three SCH) increase in 
average AP credit earned. 
The third model investigated heterogeneous effects of average dual credit earned 
by course subject. I modeled an expected outcome for cohort i of district j (Yij) as 
 𝑌+R = 	𝛼+ + 𝜆R + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃+R + 𝜷𝟐𝒁𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑪_𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑱𝑬𝑪𝑻𝒊𝒋 + 𝜀+R,																													(C3) 
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where DC_SUBJECTij represented an array of regressors that respectively measured the 
average dual credit earned in math, English, science, social sciences, foreign languages, 
health, arts, computer science, and all other dual-credit subjects for cohort i of district j. 𝜷𝟑 
was an array that respectively measured the effects of changes in average dual credit earned 
by subject. In this model and the following ones, the functional form of average dual credit 
earned was made linear to simplify the analysis. 
The fourth model investigated heterogeneous effects of average dual credit earned 
by instructor’s highest degree. I modeled an expected outcome for cohort i of district j (Yij) 
as  
 𝑌+ = 	𝛼+ + 𝜆R + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃+R + 𝜷𝟐𝒁𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑪_𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑹𝑼𝑪𝑻𝑶𝑹𝒊𝒋 	+ 𝜀+R ,					(C4) 
 
where DC_INSTRUCTORij represented an array of regressors that respectively measured 
the average amount of dual-credit earned of cohort i of district j that was taught by an 
instructor whose highest degree was a master’s degree and one whose highest degree was 
a doctorate. 𝜷𝟑 was an array that respectively measured the effects of changes in average 
dual credit earned by type of instructor. 
The fifth model investigated heterogeneous effects of average dual credit earned by 
mode of instruction. In this analysis, I modeled an expected outcome for cohort i of district 
j (Yij) as  
 𝑌+R = 	𝛼+ + 𝜆R + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃+R + 𝜷𝟐𝒁𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑪_𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒊𝒋 + 𝜀+R ,																																				(C5) 
 
where DC_Modeij represented an array measuring the average dual credit earned of cohort 
i of district j by face-to-face instruction, instruction by video, blended learning (which is a 
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combination of face-to-face and computer-based instruction), and computer-based 
instruction with no live instructor, respectively23. 𝜷𝟑 was an array that respectively 
measured the effects of changes in average dual credit earned by mode of instruction.   
The sixth and final model investigated heterogeneous effects of average dual credit 
earned by location of instruction. In this analysis, I modeled an expected outcome for 
cohort i of district j (Yij) as 
 𝑌+R = 	𝛼+ + 𝜆R + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃+R + 𝜷𝟐𝒁𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑪_𝑳𝑶𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵𝒊𝒋 + 𝜀+R,																							(C6) 
 
where DC_LOCATIONij represented an array that measured the average dual credit earned 
by cohort i of district j on a high school, community college, university, or other site, 
respectively. 𝜷𝟑 was an array that respectively measured the effects of changes in average 
dual credit earned by location of instruction. 
I tested hypotheses using a two-sided t-test. In describing the findings, I flagged 
statistical significance at p-value levels below .1, .05, .01, and .001, respectively. 
RESULTS 
Dual-credit Participation Effects 
In this subsection, I describe expected changes in student outcomes associated with 
a 10-percentage point increase in dual-credit participation. I also provide a growth rate 
relative to a baseline estimate of the expected outcome when dual-credit participation was 
zero.  
                                               
23 I combined instruction by one-way video and two-way interactive video into one category and combined 
distance learning with blended learning. Distance learning involves a minimum of 15 percent of the 
instruction time delivered through face-to-face instruction. 
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As shown in Table C3, a 10-percentage point increase in dual credit was associated 
with an increase in high school graduation by year four by 0.66 of a percentage point. This 
was a 0.91 percent growth rate relative to the baseline of 73 percent. 
Dual-credit effects on postsecondary outcomes also emerged. For every 10-
percentage point increase in dual-credit participation, the percent of students who applied 
to a Texas public university while in high school increased by one percentage point. This 
was a growth rate of 3.84 percent relative to the baseline of 26.0 percent.  
For every 10-percentage point increase in dual-credit participation, the percent of 
students admitted to a Texas public university while in high school increased by 0.96 of a 
percentage point. This was a growth rate of 4.36 percent relative to the baseline of 22.1 
percent. 
For every 10-percentage point increase in dual-credit participation, the percent of 
students who enrolled in a Texas public or private university the year following their 
expected high school graduation (year five from entering high school) increased by 0.82 of 
a percentage point. This was a growth rate of 4.1 percent relative to the baseline of 20 
percent24. 
Increases in dual-credit participation did increase community college enrollment 
but only at a marginally statistically significant level. For every 10-percentage point 
increase in dual-credit participation, the percent of students who enrolled in a Texas 
community college the year following their expected high school graduation (year five 
from entering high school) increased by 0.23 of a percentage point. This was a growth rate 
of 0.75 percent relative to the baseline of 31 percent.  
                                               
24 The difference between the baseline percent of students admitted to a Texas public college versus the 
percent enrolled in a Texas private or public college did not represent summer melt. The percent admitted 
did not include private colleges, though they were included in the enrollment figures. 
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Increases in dual-credit participation were associated with increases in associate 
degree completion. For every 10-percentage point increase in dual-credit participation, the 
percent of students who earned an associate degree within two years from expected high 
school graduation (or year six from entering high school) increased by 0.21 of a percentage 
point. This was a growth rate of 25.7 percent relative to the baseline of 0.8 percent.  
Dual credit continued to affect associate degree completion rates by year eight from 
high school entry (or four years from expected high school graduation). For every 10-
percentage point increase in dual-credit participation, the percent of students who earned 
an associate degree by year eight increased by 0.18 of a percentage point, a relative growth 
rate of 5.3 percent from its baseline estimate of 3.3 percent. 
Dual credit also improved bachelor’s degree completion rates. For every 10-
percentage point increase in dual-credit participation, the percent of students who earned a 
bachelor’s degree by year eight, ten, and twelve after entering high school increased by 
0.51, 0.56, and 0.63 of a percentage point, respectively. These were respective growth rates 
of 7.4, 3.6, and 3.5 percent relative to baseline rates of seven percent within eight years 
from entering high school, 15.5 percent within ten years from entering high school, and 
18.0 percent within twelve years from entering high school. 
Finally, dual credit affected graduate degree completion.  For every 10-percentage 
point increase in dual credit, the percent of students who earned a graduate degree within 
12 years after entering high school increased by 0.08 of a percentage point. This was a 
growth rate of 3.45 percent relative to a baseline of 2.2 percent.  
Dual credit’s effect on graduate degree completion within 13 years after entering 
high school was not statistically significant though it was positive. 
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Was More Dual Credit Better? 
The second model of this study investigated whether school districts improved 
student outcomes by increasing the average amount of dual credit earned measured in 
semester credit hours (SCH). As shown in Table C4 and illustrated in Figure C3, this study 
found more dual credit improved student outcomes.  
School districts improved four-year high school graduation rates by increasing 
average dual credit earned up to nine SCH. At nine SCH of average dual credit, high school 
graduation rates reached 77 percent; afterwards high school graduation rates began to 
decline.  
School districts improved university application, admissions, and enrollment rates 
by increasing average dual credit earned. University application rates rose to 44 percent at 
27 SCH. Admission rates increased to 38 percent at 24 SCH. University enrollment 
increased to 39.5 percent at 30 SCH.  
School districts decreased community college enrollment in the year following high 
school graduation with every increase in average dual credit earned after 3 SCH. But with 
each increase, they exponentially improved associate degree completion. Associate degree 
completion by year six reached 48 percent at 30 SCH.  Similarly, dual credit effects on 
associate degree completion by year eight reached 27 percent at 24 SCH but stopped being 
statistically significant at higher levels of average dual credit earned. Associate degree 
completion could rise as community college enrollment declined because high school 
students were earning their associate degree when they graduated from high school or 
during their enrollment at a four-year college. 
Increased levels of dual credit had the greatest impact on bachelor’s degree 
attainment. By year eight, bachelor’s degree attainment reached 52 percent at 30 SCH. By 
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year 10, it reached 77 percent at 30 SCH. By year 12, bachelor’s degree attainment reached 
67 percent at 27 SCH.    
Finally, school districts improved graduate degree attainment by year 12 and 13 by 
increasing average dual credit. Graduate degree attainment by year 12 reached 5.1 percent 
at 12 SCH of average dual credit earned. It equaled 4.7 percent by year 13 when average 
dual credit earned reached 9 SCH. 
Dual-credit effects Compared to Advanced Placement (AP) 
Equation C1 compared the effect of students earning at least one credit of dual 
credit to one credit of AP. As shown in Table C3, AP effects were larger than and 
statistically distinct from dual credit in seven of the twelve outcomes examined. The AP 
advantage occurred with the following outcomes: high school graduation, university 
application, community college enrollment, bachelor’s degree completion at year 10 and 
12, and graduate degree attainment by year 12 and 13. 
Equation C2 compared the effect of students earning increased levels of dual credit 
to increased levels of AP. As shown in Figure C3, increases in dual credit earned produced 
greater benefits that were statistically distinct from AP for every student outcome.  
The most meaningful difference found between AP and dual credit was that 
increasing levels of average dual credit were associated with larger increases in bachelor’s 
degree completion. Average dual credit of 30 SCH increased the rate of bachelor’s degree 
attainment at year eight and ten to 52 percent and 77 percent, respectively. In contrast, 
average AP caused bachelor’s degree attainment to peak at lower levels. And, the statistical 
significance of AP effects was generally lost after 18 SCH of average AP earned. Average 
AP of 18 SCH increased the rate of bachelor’s degree attainment at year eight and ten to 
ten percent and 16 percent, respectively. 
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Dual-Credit Effects by Subject  
This study found that dual-credit subjects were not equally beneficial, and one 
decreased bachelor’s degree attainment as shown in Table C5. The effect sizes described 
below were statistically significant based on a two-sided t-test and p-value of less than .05. 
They were also statistically distinct from each other, unless otherwise noted.  
High School Graduation 
A three-SCH increase in a district’s average foreign languages and social science 
dual credit was associated with an increase in high school graduation within four years by 
8.5 and 1.9 percentage points, respectively.  A three-SCH increase in a district’s average 
math dual credit was associated with a decrease in high school graduation by 3.4 percentage 
points. 
Texas Public University Application 
A three-SCH increase in a district’s average foreign languages, English, and social 
science dual credit was associated with an increase in university application rates by 8.7, 
4.0, and 3.4 percentage points, respectively.  
Texas Public University Admissions 
A three-SCH increase in a district’s average foreign language, English and social 
science dual credit was associated with an increase in university admission rates by 7.8, 
3.9, and 3.8 percentage points, respectively.  
Texas Public or Private University Enrollment 
A three-SCH increase in a district’s average foreign languages, social science, and 
English dual credit was associated with an increase in Texas university enrollment rates of 
5.5, 3.6, and 2.6 percentage points, respectively.  
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Texas Community College Enrollment 
A three-SCH increase in a district’s average computer science dual credit was 
associated with an increase in Texas community college enrollment of 11.4 percentage 
points.  
Associate Degree Attainment 
A three-SCH increase in a district’s average “other”, art, science, English, and 
social science dual credit was associated with an increase in associate degree attainment 
by year six of 14.2, 9.4, 3.3, 1.3, and 0.5 percentage points, respectively. When the time 
frame for associate degree completion was extended to year eight, the only subject that 
maintained its effect on associate degree attainment was English with an effect sizes of 2.6 
percentage points.  
Bachelor’s Degree Attainment 
A three-SCH increase in a district’s average computer science, foreign languages, 
English, social science, and math dual credit was associated with an increase in bachelor’s 
degree attainment by year eight of 5.3, 3.4, 3.3, 2.2, and 2.0 percentage points, respectively. 
A three-SCH increase in a district’s average health dual credit was associated with a 
decrease in bachelor’s degree attainment by year eight of 4.3 percentage points. 
When the time frame for bachelor’s degree completion was extended to year 10, 
the subjects that maintained their effect were computer science, English, and social science 
with effect sizes of 11.4, 4.5, and 2.6 percentage points, respectively. As before, a three-
SCH increase in a district’s average health dual credit was associated with a decrease in 
bachelor’s degree attainment by year 10. The negative effect size of average health dual 
credit equaled 7.2 percentage points.  
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When the timeframe was extended further to year 12, a three-SCH increase in a 
district’s average English, math, and social science dual credit was associated with an 
increase in bachelor’s degree attainment of 4.6, 4.1, and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. 
Graduate Degree Attainment 
No subjects produced a statistically significant effect on graduate degree 
attainment.  
Dual-Credit Effects by Instructor’s Highest Degree 
In the regression model that explored heterogeneous effects by instructor type, 
point estimates of regression coefficients varied, as shown in Table C6. However, formal 
hypotheses tests that compared the statistical equivalence of coefficients found no 
statistically significant difference between the point estimates. 
Dual-Credit Effects by Instruction Mode 
Limited variation was found in the relationship between student outcomes and dual 
credit by instruction mode. Dual-credit classes taught exclusively by computer produced 
the largest and statistically distinct effect on high school graduation rates. A three-SCH 
increase in average dual credit taught via computer was associated with a 23-percentage 
point increase in high school graduation rates as shown in Table C7.  
No other mode of instruction produced a statistically unique effect size.  
Dual-Credit Effects by Instruction Location 
Limited variation was also found in the relationship between student outcomes and 
dual credit taught at different locations. As shown in Table C8, dual credit taught on a high 
school campus produced a larger and statistically distinct effect on associate degree 
completion by year six than dual credit taught at other locations. One interpretation for this 
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could be that dual credit on a high school campus may have caused students to raise their 
college aspirations to university enrollment from community college enrollment thereby 
decreasing associate degree completion. 
DISCUSSION 
Texas is pursuing a goal of raising the postsecondary attainment of 25- to 34-year-
olds to 60 percent by 2030. To reach this goal, the state needs to increase its share of 
students enrolling and completing college. This study finds that dual credit is a systemic 
innovation that can help the state accomplish these objectives. (THECB, 2017). 
Increases in dual-credit participation led to more timely completion of associate 
and bachelor’s degrees and overall increases in associate, bachelor’s and graduate degree 
attainment. Furthermore, the results of this study suggest that more dual credit is better. As 
school districts increase their average amount of dual credit earned up to 30 semester credit 
hours, the rates of college enrollment and degree completion continuously increase. 
This study finds no evidence that dual credit produces a positive signal to university 
admission’s offices of college readiness. Increases in college enrollment associated with 
dual-credit participation are driven by increases in college application rates, not admission 
rates. 
This study also finds evidence to suggest that education leaders can increase dual-
credit impacts on associate and bachelor’s degree completion by prioritizing math, English, 
social sciences, foreign languages, science, and computer science dual credit. In contrast, 
the study finds that art, health, and “other” subjects only produced positive effects on 
associate degree completion but not bachelor’s degree completion. 
This study finds no evidence to suggest that instructors with doctoral degrees 
improve student outcomes more than those with only a master’s degree. And, it finds no 
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evidence to suggest that dual credit offered on a university or community college campus 
is more impactful on college enrollment patterns than dual credit on a high school campus. 
Impact on degree attainment was not fully identified due to data limitations discussed 
earlier. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that districts can realize efficiencies in their 
dual-credit program by prioritizing core academic subjects, using instructors who hold a 
master’s degree only, and locating dual-credit courses on their high school campuses. 
School leaders often question which type of early college coursework is most likely 
to help prepare students to succeed in college, dual credit or AP. The findings suggest that 
if school leaders must choose between the two, dual credit offers greater benefits as 
students accumulate multiple credits. Furthermore, dual credit was the only college-prep 
curriculum to significantly improve outcomes for community college students seeking an 
associate degree–Texas’s largest share of college students.  
This study finds the most important difference between AP and dual credit is that 
increased levels of average dual credit are associated with larger increases in bachelor’s 
degree completion rates than AP. This difference may be explained by AP credit not 
simultaneously representing college credit, unlike dual credit. To earn college credit, AP 
students must register for an AP test, pay for it, take the exam, and achieve a certain score. 
These four extra hurdles likely weaken the association between AP and improved 
postsecondary outcomes. 
The findings of this study are affirmed by the existing research summarized in the 
literature review with one exception. This study finds that math dual credit does not 
produce effects on college access and degree completion greater than English or social 
science dual credit. Given the current push at the highest levels for STEM education, this 
finding that English and social science dual credit provides equal, and in some cases greater 
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impact on student outcomes, is an important reminder not to forget the benefits of a strong 
humanities foundation. 
In summary, dual credit is a systemic education innovation that integrates a 
historically fragmented education system to increase postsecondary achievement. The 
findings of this study provide evidence to policymakers to support high schools and 
colleges in expanding dual credit, increasing the amount of dual credit earned per student, 
and prioritizing dual-credit courses that produce the largest effects. Any policy capping 
dual-credit enrollment per student at less than 30 SCH should be rejected. To accomplish 
this agenda, school districts will need to overcome a shortage of teachers who are qualified 
to teach dual credit and institutions of higher education will need to embrace their role as 
partners with secondary education. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The Free-Market Coalition analyzed in Chapter 2 has led the Texas higher 
education subsystem since 2003. It has pursued the dual goal of raising the education 
levels of Texas residents without increasing overall per-capita state spending. In the 
context of a growing population with growing needs in health, transportation, water, and 
other areas, the governing coalition has pursued its dual education/fiscal policy goal by 
shifting the financial responsibility of higher education to others (local governments, 
universities, and students and their families) and creating the need for innovation in 
response to state government austerity and greater public transparency of student 
outcomes. 
While they have met their fiscal austerity goal, Figure D1 suggests the Free-
Market Coalition will not reach its ambitious goal of raising the percent of 25- to 34-
year-olds earning a college certificate or degree to 60 percent by 2030 (often referred to 
as the 60x30 goal) unless there is a change in the historic growth rates of college access 
and completion. Figure D1 illustrates educational attainment levels of cohorts of Texas 
students by the year in which they entered eighth grade. The rates of postsecondary 
degree or certificate attainment are based on following students up to six years after their 
expected high school graduation date. The percent of students earning a postsecondary 
degree or certificate increased with each passing cohort, but by very slight gains. As 
shown by Figure D1, 21.1 percent of students who entered eighth grade in 2000 earned a 
postsecondary degree or certificate. Six cohorts later, 25.2 percent of students who 
entered eighth grade in 2006 earned a postsecondary degree or certificate. This 
represented an average annual growth rate of three percent. Based on this growth rate, the 
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projected percent of 25- to 34-year-olds who enrolled in a Texas public school and who 
went on to earn a postsecondary degree or certificate from a Texas public or private 
institution of higher education equaled 32.5 percent by 2030.  
This projection did not account for Texas private-school students, Texas students 
who leave the state for college and return, or students from other states who move to 
Texas. Despite these missing subgroups, if Texas does not significantly increase the rate 
of postsecondary access and completion of its public-school students, which comprise 
approximately 95 percent of its school-age population (NCES, 2017), it will not meet its 
60x30 goal. 
Conservative state policymakers should consider the full economic impact of 
targeted education investments on the state’s economy. They can achieve their education 
goal and improve the state’s economy by investing in programs that have proven effects 
on raising the education and productivity of their workforce. These education investments 
can be justified based on their long-term effect on raising state and local tax revenue, 
reducing dependence on public services, and increasing household incomes. TEXAS 
Grants is an example of a targeted policy that produces a positive return on investment to 
the state. 
The TEXAS Grant program produced a 4.4 percent return on investment to the 
state’s economy, or a net economic benefit equal to $1.4 billion, as outlined in Table D1. 
This calculation accounted for TEXAS Grants’ impact on taxpayers, student debt, and 
lifetime earnings of students. Taxpayer impacts accounted for taxes paid, social program 
costs, incarceration costs, and the cost of education paid for by taxpayers (Carroll & 
Erku, 2009).  The marginal increase in lifetime earnings represented the marginal benefit 
of moving an average student from having some college to having a bachelor’s degree. It 
also accounted for the marginal benefit of earning a graduate degree (Day & Newburger, 
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2002). These estimates, unlike the data used in this current study, spanned forty years of a 
person’s working life. 
In addition to increasing state spending for targeted programs, there exist two 
other strategies that state policymakers should pursue. First, they should reallocate 
existing education funds to programs that produce larger impacts. The state should launch 
a program to systematically evaluate the impact of all state-supported education programs 
that aim to increase postsecondary outcomes. This is a large project, but a starting point 
should be all state-supported student financial aid programs. State policymakers should 
also systematically eliminate or reduce education funding that is not intended to improve 
measurable postsecondary student outcomes. These often represent special projects 
important to a local constituency but do not support the state’s 60x30 goal.  
This study identified two policies that produce measurable and meaningful 
impacts on postsecondary degree attainment: TEXAS Grants and dual credit. 
Unfortunately, both of these policies have been only moderately implemented. A 
reallocation of existing education funds should result in fully funding TEXAS Grants. 
Policymakers should also consider creating a new financial aid program to incentivize 
more high school students and their school districts to increase dual-credit participation 
and ensure quality.   
This dual-credit grant program could be funded with existing general revenue that 
is reprogramed from less effective spending. Because dual-credit programs are subsidized 
by school districts and supported by low-cost community colleges, this program would be 
the most cost-efficient approach for increasing college access and completion. It would 
also produce the additional benefit of minimizing time out of the workforce, as dual-
credit students complete college within a shorter timespan than their counterparts who do 
not earn dual credit.  
 92 
To illustrate the efficiency of a dual-credit grant program, consider the use of 
$100 million in state funding. A grant program of $100 million pays for the tuition and 
fees of approximately 22,862 students earning 15 credit hours at the average Texas public 
university25. This money could alternatively pay for approximately 105,263 high school 
students earning 15 credit hours before they graduate from high school26.  
In addition to creating this dual-credit grant program, the state should work with 
school districts and institutions of higher education to identify solutions for overcoming 
barriers to dual-credit participation. These barriers include the decline in college-ready 
student identification due to a loss of state-mandated high school exams, which were 
previously used to qualify students as college-ready; professional development of dual-
credit teachers in high-demand core academic subjects; and the transfer of core academic 
dual-credit subjects to degree programs.  
Second, state policymakers should develop new financial models for helping 
financially-constrained, but college-ready, students access and complete college. The 
state should explore any and all mechanisms to innovate the financing of higher 
education. Two examples include income-sharing agreements (ISA’s) and a state version 
of Loans for Educational Opportunity (Dynarski & Kreisman, 2013).  
ISA’s are agreements between student borrowers and lenders. In exchange for 
financial aid to finance postsecondary education, students agree to share a fixed percent 
of their future earnings with the lenders for a fixed set of years after they leave college. 
Advances are based on a student’s expected future earnings. Students completing degrees 
                                               
25 This calculation was based on the fall 2016 average tuition and fees of Texas public universities of 
$4,374 for a full-time student enrolled in 15 SCH.  
26 This calculation was based on cost figures provided by Alamo Colleges, which set the cost of a dual-
credit classroom of 15 students earning 3 SCH at $2,800. After multiplying by five and rounding up, the 
cost per dual-credit student earning 15 SCH equals $950. 
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with higher expected earnings, such as engineering majors, can receive more of an 
advance. Students who earn below their expected earnings repay less than expected. 
Students who earn more than their expected earnings repay more than expected, though 
some agreements cap the total repayment amount.  
The Texas legislature should pass legislation creating the framework for Texas 
universities to engage in providing ISA’s. It could also create and fund a pilot project to 
evaluate the effectiveness of this financial model. 
 The authors of the Loans for Educational Opportunity (LEO) program believe 
that US students are not experiencing a student debt problem but a repayment problem. 
Part of their policy solution is to create a single loan program that would be repaid 
through the US government’s social security payroll tax deduction system. Students with 
student debt would have their payroll deducted each month by a low fixed percent for up 
to 25 years or until their loan was repaid. If a student became unemployed, their loan 
repayment deductions would be automatically suspended and would automatically 
resume upon reemployment.  
The Texas legislature should consider adopting aspects of the LEO program to 
improve the state’s existing college loan programs. Important improvements include 
subsidizing the interest payment, simplifying the application process, and authorizing the 
Texas Workforce Commission to use the state payroll deduction system to automatically 
collect loan repayments for students employed in Texas. 
In conclusion, state policymakers have opportunities to make targeted investments, 
advance systemic innovations, and create new finance models that reduce the financial 
constraints that prevent college-ready students from earning a postsecondary degree in a 
timely fashion.
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Appendix A 
 
 
Mean N Prob > F
Democrat -1.2 0.018 *** 725 0.000
Table A1. Truncated Regression Results Testing Party Polarization
SE
Note: The dependent variable is a liberal-conservative score derived from non-
lopsided roll call votes and produced using a Bayesian estimation procedure 
developed by Stanford University professor Simon Jackman.
The p-values thresholds are represented at the following levels: < .1 +, < .05 
*, < .01 **,  < .001 ***
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Note: A count of bills with a given topic is stated with the parenthesis next to the topic name. During the study 
period, 1995 to 2013, Democrats, the party of legislators who belong to the Egalitarian Coalition, represented 
46.6 percent of all legislators, while Republicans, the party of legislators who belong to the Free-Market 
Coalition, represented 53.4 percent. All topics represent bills that promote the given topic unless otherwise 
stated. ISRT stands for in-state resident tuition. Privatization represents any bill that includes an aspect of 
privatization. Grant aid includes merit-based, need-based, and other types.
Figure A1. Percent of Higher Education Finance Bills by Coalition of Primary Author & by Topic 
(Frequency), Pooled Across 1995 to 2013 Legislatures
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Tuition Rebate (11)
Research Funding (44)
Tuition Deregulation (23)
College Cost Containment (100)
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Figure A2. Party Composition, 74th to 83rd Texas Legislatures, (1995 to 2014)
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Source: The Texas Legislative Reference Library
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Figure A3. Average Annual Tuition and Fees and State 
Institutional Funding per Full-Time Equivalent Student 
(2016 Real Dollars)
Community Colleges
Public Universities
Note: The combined data series does not include revenue other than state institutional fund and tuition 
and fees. State institutional funding does not include TEXAS grant funding or any other student 
financial aid. Tuition and fees represent the published cost of tuition and mandatory fees for a student 
enrolled in 15 semester credit hours. It does not include discounts for student financial aid.
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Source: Figures are sourced from general appropriation bills and are expressed in 2016 real dollars.
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Figure A4. TEXAS Grant Allocation (2016 Real Dollars)
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Figure A5. Percent of Higher Education Finance Bills that Passed by Coalition of Primary 
Author & by Topic (Frequency), Pooled Across 1995 to 2001 Legislatures
Note: A count of bills with a given topic is stated with the parenthesis next to the topic name. During 
the study period, 1995 to 2001, Democrats, the party of legislators who belong to the Egalitarian 
Coalition, represented 54 percent of all legislators, while Republicans, the party of legislators who 
belong to the Free-Market Coalition, represented 46 percent. All topics represent bills that promote the 
given topic unless otherwise stated. ISRT stands for in-state resident tuition. Privatization represents 
any bill that includes an aspect of privatization. Grant aid includes merit-based, need-based, and other 
types.
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Note: A count of bills with a given topic is stated with the parenthesis next to the topic name. During 
the study period, 2003 to 2013, Democrats, the party of legislators who belong to the Egalitarian 
Coalition, represented 41 percent of all legislators, while Republicans, the party of legislators who 
belong to the Free-Market Coalition, represented 59 percent. All topics represent bills that promote the 
given topic unless otherwise stated. ISRT stands for in-state resident tuition. Privatization represents 
any bill that includes an aspect of privatization. Grant aid includes merit-based, need-based, and other 
types.
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Figure A6. Percent of Higher Education Finance Bills that Passed by Coalition of Primary 
Author & by Topic (Frequency), Pooled Across 2003 to 2013 Legislatures
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Figure A7. 
Texas Population, Gross Domestic Product, & State General Revenue, 1997 to 2015
Source: Population figures provided by Texas State Library. Gross State Product was retrieved from 
www.bea.gov. General Revenue was retrieved from appropriation bills. Dollars in 2016 real dollars.
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Figure A8. 
Texas State General Revenue (GR) & GR per Capita, 1997 to 2015
Note: The left axis represents Texas state general revenue (GR) in billions. The right axis represents 
per-capita GR in dollars. Population figures provided by Texas State Library. General Revenue was 
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Appendix B 
Table B1 summarizes the eight published studies that used experimental or quasi-
experimental methods for estimating student grant aid effects on college graduation rates 
(Alon, 2005; Alon, 2007; Bettinger, Gurantz, Kawano, & Sacerdote, 2016; Castleman & 
Long, 2013; Dynarski, 2008; Goldrick-Rab, Kelchen, Harris, & Bensen, 2016; Scott-
Clayton, 2011; Scott-Clayton & Zafar, 2016). Two of the eight were by authors who 
revised their estimates with more data. As summarized in Table B1, using the six 
unduplicated studies, I found that weighted average grant aid of $5,705 increased college 
completion by 2.72 percentage points. The weighted average timeframe used to measure 
college completion was approximately 11 years. Overall, for every $1,000 of grant aid, 
bachelor’s degree completion increased by 0.46 percentage points based on a weighted 
average of effect sizes and grant aid. 
I produced these findings by using a fixed-effects meta-analysis model that 
weighed each study by the inverse of their estimated variance. Studies varied by grant aid 
amount, time to completion studied, location, eligibility requirements, and how they 
define treatment effects (treatment-on-treated versus intent-to-treat effects). 
Consequently, I found heterogeneity to be statistically significant. Therefore, the meta-
analysis’ effect size should be interpreted as an average of different grant programs 
already evaluated and can serve as a useful benchmark for the findings of this study. 
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Study
Effect 
Size SE
% 
Weight
Avg 
Annual 
Grant 
Amount 
(Nominal 
dollars)
Avg Annual 
Grant 
Amount 
(2016 
dollars)
Grad 
Rate 
Term Type Site
Latest 
Cohort 
Studied
Alon 2007 1.5 2.40 2.32 $1,000 $1,936 6 TOT USA 1989
Bettinger et al 2016 2.6 0.90 16.51 $9,000 $13,248 15 ITT California 1998
Bettinger et al 2016 4.6 1.40 6.82 $9,000 $13,248 15 ITT California 1998
Cattleman Long 2013 5.2 2.40 2.32 $1,300 $1,812 7 ITT Florida 2000
Dynarski 2008 2.52 0.44 69.09 $2,500 $3,825 10 ITT Georgia, Ark. 1996
Goldrick-Rab 2016 4.2 3.30 1.23 $3,500 $3,903 4 ITT Wisconson 2008
Scott-Clayton Zafar 2016 1.9 2.80 1.71 $2,500 $3,260 10 TOT W. Virgina 2003
Weighted average 2.72 $5,924 10.9
Weighted average per $1000 0.46
Table B1. Summary of Existing Grant Aid Impact Studies and Results of a Fixed Effects Meta-Analysis
Meta-Analysis Grant Program Design
Note: This table summarizes the results of a fixed effects meta-analysis and describes the studies included in the analysis. The 
overall annual grant amount and graduation rate represented weighted averages of the original studies. TOT indicates a study 
estimated treatment-on-the-treated effect sizes. ITT indicates the study estimated intent-to-treat effect sizes. Studies that are 
repeated offered multiple effect size estimates using either different study populations or methodologies.
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Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Age 18.02 0.32 18.01 0.31
Female 0.57 0.58
Black 0.03 0.03
Hispanic 0.10 0.08
White 0.84 0.86
Asian 0.03 0.03
Other 0.004 0.004
Immigrant 0.00 0.00
First-generation college student 0.36 0.39
Dual credits earned 0.89 1.73 0.87 1.70
Advanced Placement credits earned 2.69 2.77 2.61 2.69
Top 10% high school rank 0.32 0.32
Top 25% high school rank 0.59 0.59
SAT Score 1046 177 1035 167
High school distinguished diploma 0.30 0.28
High school recommended diploma 0.70 0.72
Other grants received in year one 4675 4404 4353 3950
Work-study aid in year one 86 451 126 533
Loan aid in year one 4218 5074 4335 4220
TEXAS grant eligible 0.52 0.57
TEXAS grant awardee 0.40 0.44
TEXAS grant awardee in year one 0.38 0.43
TEXAS grant awardee in year two 0.24 0.27
TEXAS grant awardee in year three 0.12 0.14
TEXAS grant awardee in year four 0.08 0.10
TEXAS grant awardee in year five 0.03 0.04
Restricted Sample:                      
$2,600 < EFC < $5,400  
(N=38,571)
 Unrestricted Sample:                      
EFC >= $0              
(N=358,226)
Table B2. Descriptive Statistics of Pretreatment Covariates of Students Who Meet All 
Eligibility Criteria Other Than EFC
Note: The distribution of students by estimated family contributon (EFC) peaks at zero, declines 
rapidly as EFC increases, and has a long right tail. The disproportionate share of low-income 
students to high-income students explains why the share of TEXAS grant eligible in the 
unrestricted populatoin is only slightly less than the restricted population.
 106 
 
Student Outcomes Mean
Relative 
Growth 
Rate Mean SD
Bandwidth                
+/-                    
$4,000 EFC N
Other Grant Aid in Year 1 -631.196 262.066 * -12.8% 4927.33 14802.99 1,242        24,709 
Work-Study Aid in Year 1 -106.911 45.054 * -46.5% 229.72 369.07 1,248        24,808 
Loan Aid in Year 1 -2493.118 286.915 * -40.5% 6154.32 10252.79 1,013        24,808 
Persist to Year 2 -0.009 0.024 -1.0% 0.86 1.29 890           17,560 
Persist to Year 3 0.025 0.021 2.9% 0.87 1.20 1,083        18,788 
Persist to Year 4 0.019 0.019 2.1% 0.89 1.03 1,180        18,514 
Continuous Enrollment 0.054 0.029 + 8.2% 0.66 0.01 825           16,301 
SCH Cumm in Year 1 -0.043 0.236 -0.2% 28.65 0.64 1,240        24,652 
SCH Cumm in Year 2 0.975 0.818 1.9% 51.95 2.87 892           17,577 
SCH Cumm in Year 3 2.849 1.448 * 3.9% 73.00 6.17 859           16,973 
SCH Cumm in Year 4 5.208 2.03 * 5.7% 91.21 9.80 913           17,993 
Bachelor's Grad Rate 4-Yrs 0.058 0.032 + 22.3% 0.26 0.01 892           17,600 
Bachelor's Grad Rate 5-Yrs 0.096 0.031 ** 20.8% 0.46 0.01 977           16,697 
Bachelor's Grad Rate 6-Yrs 0.067 0.031 * 12.1% 0.56 0.01 1,227        17,767 
Bachelor's Grad Rate 7-Yrs 0.061 0.026 * 10.3% 0.60 0.01 2,129        26,029 
Bachelor's Grad Rate 8-Yrs 0.031 0.036 4.9% 0.64 0.01 1,637        15,381 
Total Debt -6499.323 1795.333 *** -23.7% 27373.47 160339.73 935           18,481 
Graduate Degree Grad Rate 6-Yrs 0.014 0.010 49.2% 0.03 0.00 1,188        17,161 
Graduate Degree Grad Rate 7-Yrs 0.004 0.016 7.6% 0.06 0.00 1,524        18,297 
Graduate Degree Grad Rate 8-Yrs 0.020 0.017 24.8% 0.08 0.00 1,301        12,076 
Graduate Degree Grad Rate 9-Yrs 0.046 0.024 + 51.1% 0.09 0.00 864           5,954   
Graduate Degree Grad Rate 10-Yrs 0.063 0.027 * 64.8% 0.10 0.00 1,706        7,755   
P-value thresholds are represented at the following levels: < 0.001 ***, < 0.01 **, <0.05 *, < 0.1 + .
Table B3.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Treatment-on-treated Effects of TEXAS Grants & Growth Rates Relative to Expected Control Group Outcomes
TOT Effect Size Control Group
SE
Note: TOT effect size represents the treatment-on-treated effect size produced by a regression discontinunity instrumental-variable 
methodology. The relative growth rate represents the TOT effect size divided by the expected control group outcome. Control 
group represents students near the $4,000 estimated family contribution cutpoint and within the optimized bandwidth. Effect size 
standard errors are clustered by cohort and university enrolled in freshmen year. Year refers to the year post college entry. SCH 
represents semester credit hours. Q4Q1 represents the time span between October to the following March.
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Student Outcomes Mean
Relative 
Growth 
Rate Mean SD
Bandwidth                
+/-                    
$4,000 EFC N
Earnings Q4Q1 Year 1 -401.748 148.967 ** -30.4% 1322.37 10662.91 1,185        13,578 
Earnings Q4Q1 Year 2 -449.976 190.291 * -18.2% 2467.83 14986.13 1,297        18,565 
Earnings Q4Q1 Year 3 -82.463 316.17 -2.5% 3252.89 16846.42 854           11,754 
Earnings Q4Q1 Year 4 -22.823 303.454 -0.5% 4153.49 18357.45 1,078        14,595 
Employed Year 1 -0.007 0.026 -1.1% 0.69 0.01 996           19,674 
Employed Year 2 -0.025 0.022 -3.3% 0.75 0.01 1,023        20,211 
Employed Year 3 0.014 0.026 1.8% 0.75 0.01 1,011        19,966 
Employed Year 4 -0.020 0.021 -2.5% 0.78 0.01 1,232        24,516 
Employed Year 5 -0.005 0.021 -0.6% 0.79 0.01 1,372        27,346 
Employed Year 6 0.022 0.020 2.8% 0.79 0.01 1,589        27,648 
Employed Year 7 0.026 0.025 3.3% 0.79 0.01 1,473        21,406 
Employed Year 8 0.028 0.022 3.6% 0.78 0.01 1,846        22,322 
Employed Year 9 0.045 0.028 5.9% 0.77 0.01 2,068        19,682 
Employed Year 10 0.016 0.045 2.1% 0.77 0.01 1,136        7,787   
Earnings Year 1 -617.281 330.498 + -11.2% 5526.54 15302.01 1,636        22,638 
Earnings Year 2 -646.930 465.386 -8.2% 7914.81 23213.78 1,488        22,032 
Earnings Year 3 -862.503 567.489 -8.6% 10052.01 28713.28 1,307        19,513 
Earnings Year 4 815.247 709.968 6.9% 11901.04 35818.47 1,108        16,787 
Earnings Year 5 1960.679 1163.509 + 10.2% 19272.21 60884.63 1,179        18,536 
Earnings Year 6 1563.040 1212.417 5.9% 26308.34 71320.61 1,533        21,239 
Earnings Year 7 1237.027 1541.532 3.9% 31865.62 107220.09 1,440        16,633 
Earnings Year 8 557.740 1824.990 1.5% 36833.23 135966.58 1,498        14,175 
Earnings Year 9 1642.411 2255.732 4.0% 40774.69 146929.27 1,577        11,616 
Earnings Year 10 2320.994 3231.683 5.2% 44802.86 249565.81 1,346        7,195   
P-value thresholds are represented at the following levels: < 0.001 ***, < 0.01 **, <0.05 *, < 0.1 + .
Note: TOT effect size represents the treatment-on-treated effect size produced by a regression discontinunity instrumental-variable 
methodology. The relative growth rate represents the TOT effect size divided by the expected control group outcome. Control 
group represents students near the $4,000 estimated family contribution cutpoint and within the optimized bandwidth. Effect size 
standard errors are clustered by cohort and university enrolled in freshmen year. Year refers to the year post college entry. SCH 
represents semester credit hours. Q4Q1 represents the time span between October to the following March.
SE
TOT Effect Size Control Group
Table B3 Continued.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Treatment-on-treated Effects of TEXAS Grants & Growth Rates Relative to Expected Control Group Outcomes
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0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Other Grant Aid in Year 1
TOT -435 -526 -528 -734 -744 -631 -627 -614 -632 -653 -676
SE 358 316 315 286 277 262 240 233 218 206 192
+ + * ** * ** ** ** ** ***
N 12189 14685 17155 19598 22115 24709 27245 29846 32558 35165 37766
Work-Study Aid in Year 1
TOT -72 -86 -102 -111 -111 -107 -123 -122 -110 -114 -128
SE 64 59 56 48 47 45 43 40 38 35 34
  + * * * ** ** ** ** ***
N 12223 14768 17231 19714 22191 24808 27367 30008 32703 35307 37936
Loan Aid in Year 1
TOT -2744 -2511 -2421 -2309 -2477 -2493 -2339 -2403 -2206 -2233 -2180
SE 380 360 331 331 294 287 283 273 272 265 259
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
N 9903 11913 13909 16018 17969 20023 22044 24124 26217 28334 30483
Persist to Year 2
TOT -0.051 -0.039 -0.018 -0.026 -0.029 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 0.000 -0.006
SE 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.03 0.028 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.02 0.018 0.018
           
N 8773 10480 12223 13981 15841 17560 19316 21123 22893 24791 26610
Persist to Year 3
TOT 0.067 0.067 0.054 0.039 0.039 0.025 0.023 0.017 0.008 0.004 0.008
SE 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.02 0.019 0.019 0.019
* * * + +       
N 9321 11180 13073 14996 16855 18788 20696 22689 24670 26684 28762
Persist to Year 4
TOT 0.045 0.046 0.061 0.046 0.036 0.019 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.009
SE 0.029 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.015
N 9144 11030 12975 14814 16658 18514 20459 22430 24429 26416 28375
Continuous Enrollment to Year 4
TOT 0.033 0.041 0.062 0.056 0.056 0.054 0.062 0.052 0.035 0.024 0.019
SE 0.041 0.043 0.038 0.036 0.033 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.022
    + + * *    
N 8129 9689 11298 12925 14618 16301 17871 19508 21190 22842 24594
SCH Cumm in Year 1
TOT -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
SE 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
           
N 12146 14635 17115 19553 22059 24652 27184 29781 32481 35081 37661
SCH Cumm in Year 2
TOT 0.0 0.7 1.1 0.8 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.8 0.6
SE 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
           
N 8773 10480 12248 14000 15858 17577 19341 21147 22939 24830 26653
SCH Cumm in Year 3
TOT 2.3 2.2 3.5 2.9 2.3 2.8 3.0 2.8 1.8 1.8 1.4
SE 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1
  +   * * *  +  
N 8437 10076 11786 13487 15243 16973 18665 20359 22101 23861 25660
SCH Cumm in Year 4
TOT 4.9 5.8 6.2 5.2 4.2 5.2 4.7 3.0 2.9 2.3 2.4
SE 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
 + * * + * * + +   
N 8989 10741 12513 14363 16238 17993 19811 21673 23511 25401 27286
Table B4. Robustness Check of Effect Size Estimate by Varying Bandwidths
Bandwidth multiplied 
by following scales
Note: TOT effect size represents the treatment-on-treated effect size produced by a regression discontinunity instrumental-
variable methodology. The relative growth rate represents the TOT effect size divided by the expected control group outcome. 
Control group represents students near the $4,000 estimated family contribution cutpoint and within the optimized bandwidth. 
Effect size standard errors are clustered by cohort and university enrolled in freshmen year. Year refers to the year post college 
entry. SCH represents semester credit hours. Q4Q1 represents the time span between October to the following March.
P-value thresholds are represented at the following levels: < 0.001 ***, < 0.01 **, <0.05 *, < 0.1 + .
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0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Bachelor's Grad Rate 4-Yrs
TOT 0.060 0.077 0.081 0.068 0.057 0.058 0.050 0.043 0.042 0.046 0.039
SE 0.044 0.042 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.03 0.03 0.028 0.027 0.028
 + * + + + +   +  
N 8790 10497 12248 14000 15871 17600 19356 21175 22939 24853 26677
Bachelor's Grad Rate 5-Yrs
TOT 0.067 0.110 0.101 0.100 0.112 0.096 0.068 0.073 0.065 0.054 0.055
SE 0.046 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028
 ** ** ** *** ** * ** * + *
N 8279 9911 11627 13358 15015 16697 18389 20091 21872 23627 25353
Bachelor's Grad Rate 6-Yrs
TOT 0.111 0.107 0.101 0.089 0.057 0.067 0.056 0.050 0.054 0.052 0.051
SE 0.044 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.026
* ** ** * + * + + + * *
N 8812 10575 12382 14131 15927 17767 19566 21379 23297 25169 26985
Bachelor's Grad Rate 7-Yrs
TOT 0.044 0.041 0.033 0.044 0.052 0.061 0.070 0.056 0.052 0.044 0.045
SE 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.030 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.022
    * * ** * * + *
N 12680 15218 17859 20578 23254 26029 28939 31903 34831 37970 41063
Bachelor's Grad Rate 8-Yrs
TOT 0.111 0.083 0.050 0.053 0.033 0.031 0.044 0.044 0.054 0.063 0.063
SE 0.041 0.042 0.036 0.038 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.028
** +       + * *
N 7645 9108 10599 12141 13763 15381 16964 18592 20287 22074 23863
Total Debt
TOT -6969 -6199 -5972 -5510 -6089 -6499 -6818 -6566 -6982 -6572 -6933
SE 2312 2241 2008 1921 1887 1795 1722 1628 1549 1529 1419
** ** ** ** ** *** *** *** *** *** ***
N 9183 11001 12842 14768 16647 18481 20313 22191 24124 26046 28001
Graduate Degree Grad Rate 6-Yrs
TOT 0.026 0.035 0.032 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.008
SE 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009
 * *         
N 8518 10231 12016 13722 15428 17161 18906 20689 22505 24362 26140
Graduate Degree Grad Rate 7-Yrs
TOT 0.044 0.026 0.027 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.014 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.018
SE 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013
*         +  
N 9113 10915 12708 14558 16369 18297 20247 22129 24088 26069 28216
Graduate Degree Grad Rate 8-Yrs
TOT 0.057 0.042 0.034 0.029 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.023 0.029 0.030 0.031
SE 0.023 0.019 0.021 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.016
* *        + +
N 6043 7271 8461 9660 10836 12076 13330 14628 15924 17184 18480
Graduate Degree Grad Rate 9-Yrs
TOT 0.027 0.020 0.055 0.046 0.052 0.046 0.049 0.052 0.039 0.029 0.033
SE 0.030 0.022 0.022 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.021
  * + * + + * +   
N 2997 3583 4164 4755 5353 5954 6550 7109 7696 8311 8915
Graduate Degree Grad Rate 10-Yrs
TOT 0.059 0.061 0.052 0.046 0.058 0.063 0.059 0.052 0.043 0.035 0.030
SE 0.037 0.030 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.024 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020
 * * + * * * * * +  
N 3780 4521 5321 6089 6940 7755 8568 9421 10306 11230 12199
Table B4 Continued. Robustness Check of Effect Size Estimate by Varying Bandwidths
Bandwidth multiplied 
by following scales
Note: TOT effect size represents the treatment-on-treated effect size produced by a regression discontinunity instrumental-
variable methodology. The relative growth rate represents the TOT effect size divided by the expected control group outcome. 
Control group represents students near the $4,000 estimated family contribution cutpoint and within the optimized bandwidth. 
Effect size standard errors are clustered by cohort and university enrolled in freshmen year. Year refers to the year post college 
entry. SCH represents semester credit hours. Q4Q1 represents the time span between October to the following March.
P-value thresholds are represented at the following levels: < 0.001 ***, < 0.01 **, <0.05 *, < 0.1 + .
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0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Earnings Q4Q1 Year 1
TOT -517 -423 -374 -324 -305 -402 -454 -370 -342 -338 -355
SE 225 202 194 164 152 149 154 144 135 124 123
* * + * * ** ** * * ** **
N 11591 13955 16406 18725 21073 23495 25941 28417 30924 33502 35947
Earnings Q4Q1 Year 2
TOT -234 -31 -119 -181 -289 -450 -375 -325 -343 -340 -339
SE 275 245 207 206 198 190 189 191 170 172 158
     * * + * * *
N 12730 15353 17894 20472 23091 25804 28506 31258 34022 36756 39501
Earnings Q4Q1 Year 3
TOT -529 -477 -377 -236 -7 -82 -174 -156 -189 -244 -328
SE 484 419 405 395 363 316 292 284 275 269 259
           
N 8394 10023 11702 13401 15128 16894 18558 20250 21942 23681 25495
Earnings Q4Q1 Year 4
TOT -399 -255 -139 -132 12 -23 66 26 10 -37 -53
SE 471 471 409 368 329 303 288 293 284 307 293
           
N 10576 12694 14874 17024 19143 21325 23495 25735 27979 30257 32596
Employed Year 1
TOT -0.040 -0.019 0.007 0.004 -0.010 -0.007 0.007 0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007
SE 0.046 0.038 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.022
           
N 9760 11702 13661 15735 17680 19674 21673 23681 25757 27864 29937
Employed Year 2
TOT -0.027 -0.036 -0.028 -0.007 -0.022 -0.025 -0.027 -0.011 -0.026 -0.026 -0.024
SE 0.040 0.031 0.030 0.026 0.025 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.021
           
N 9995 12055 14074 16177 18176 20211 22251 24432 26488 28637 30819
Employed Year 3
TOT 0.053 0.042 0.032 0.041 0.029 0.014 0.009 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.000
SE 0.039 0.033 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.020
           
N 9886 11895 13872 15979 17928 19966 21965 24054 26136 28271 30420
Employed Year 4
TOT -0.030 -0.015 -0.018 -0.026 -0.028 -0.020 -0.015 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.010
SE 0.030 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.017
           
N 12083 14555 17024 19442 21928 24516 27031 29578 32276 34869 37441
Employed Year 5
TOT 0.031 0.010 -0.005 -0.016 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.008 0.003 -0.003
SE 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018
           
N 13445 16276 18948 21707 24557 27346 30238 33195 36065 38985 42005
Employed Year 6
TOT 0.053 0.040 0.028 0.021 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.013 0.009 0.013
SE 0.031 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
+           
N 13581 16316 19038 21872 24717 27648 30513 33417 36447 39473 42528
Employed Year 7
TOT 0.038 0.053 0.045 0.032 0.029 0.026 0.014 0.016 0.021 0.017 0.021
SE 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022
           
N 10596 12746 14850 17002 19191 21406 23676 25929 28190 30539 32890
Employed Year 8
TOT 0.037 0.016 0.021 0.030 0.027 0.028 0.024 0.018 0.020 0.010 0.008
SE 0.034 0.032 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.020
           
N 11032 13199 15405 17673 20061 22322 24761 27194 29743 32293 34831
Employed Year 9
TOT 0.022 0.007 0.025 0.033 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.043 0.034 0.033 0.029
SE 0.039 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.021
           
N 9575 11515 13497 15550 17536 19682 21905 24171 26365 28741 31162
Employed Year 10
TOT 0.017 0.046 0.042 0.038 0.025 0.016 0.030 0.041 0.050 0.035 0.043
SE 0.073 0.070 0.062 0.052 0.052 0.045 0.041 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.033
           
N 3918 4704 5498 6245 7012 7787 8591 9407 10257 11103 11929
Table B4 Continued. Robustness Check of Effect Size Estimate by Varying Bandwidths
Bandwidth multiplied 
by following scales
Note: TOT effect size represents the treatment-on-treated effect size produced by a regression discontinunity instrumental-
variable methodology. The relative growth rate represents the TOT effect size divided by the expected control group outcome. 
Control group represents students near the $4,000 estimated family contribution cutpoint and within the optimized bandwidth. 
Effect size standard errors are clustered by cohort and university enrolled in freshmen year. Year refers to the year post college 
entry. SCH represents semester credit hours. Q4Q1 represents the time span between October to the following March.
P-value thresholds are represented at the following levels: < 0.001 ***, < 0.01 **, <0.05 *, < 0.1 + .
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0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Earnings Year 1
TOT -861 -831 -839 -1011 -869 -617 -802 -733 -556 -583 -520
SE 485 436 418 410 374 330 313 293 270 241 228
+ + * * * + * * * * *
N 11215 13378 15622 17899 20220 22638 24950 27385 29866 32330 34800
Earnings Year 2
TOT -108 -243 -369 -610 -704 -647 -520 -562 -538 -447 -428
SE 594 494 511 498 480 465 417 407 359 346 321
           
N 10947 13117 15239 17480 19745 22032 24424 26697 29048 31501 33891
Earnings Year 3
TOT -1050 -511 -451 -541 -645 -863 -814 -536 -650 -874 -765
SE 879 803 717 679 594 567 542 547 517 509 463
         + +
N 9705 11653 13578 15513 17494 19513 21537 23576 25665 27701 29823
Earnings Year 4
TOT 495 509 387 501 804 815 572 424 440 562 344
SE 1073 949 899 805 741 710 643 654 642 655 608
           
N 8371 10026 11712 13401 15066 16787 18568 20305 22089 23868 25698
Earnings Year 5
TOT -203 462 843 935 1829 1961 1860 1513 1780 1596 1378
SE 1632 1528 1473 1351 1265 1164 1034 999 1007 926 896
     + +  + +  
N 9177 11034 12946 14772 16648 18536 20469 22405 24411 26407 28349
Earnings Year 6
TOT 1241 708 1696 1842 1102 1563 1717 1419 1413 1722 1781
SE 1906 1695 1540 1381 1304 1212 1131 1129 1112 1033 950
         + +
N 10473 12570 14702 16884 19066 21239 23488 25663 27954 30260 32641
Earnings Year 7
TOT 894 1131 1499 1600 548 1237 1465 1362 1019 1249 1385
SE 2276 2075 2042 1840 1701 1542 1392 1329 1261 1258 1197
           
N 8258 9926 11583 13243 14940 16633 18371 20118 21808 23614 25442
Earnings Year 8
TOT 827 1084 1764 1077 650 558 762 36 616 1046 1580
SE 2710 2355 2288 2100 1999 1825 1718 1617 1541 1544 1438
           
N 7121 8472 9888 11319 12738 14175 15651 17112 18626 20160 21802
Earnings Year 9
TOT -329 471 465 128 2328 1642 1905 2360 2683 3087 3398
SE 3068 2835 2440 2238 2252 2256 2164 2087 2217 2029 1907
          +
N 5778 6944 8063 9214 10378 11616 12833 14060 15297 16616 17939
Earnings Year 10
TOT -299 2775 2592 3217 2216 2321 2600 2780 2370 2880 2596
SE 4683 3908 3962 3504 3462 3232 3054 3049 2826 2712 2935
           
N 3582 4311 5029 5733 6450 7195 7958 8718 9460 10215 11008
Table B4 Continued. Robustness Check of Effect Size Estimate by Varying Bandwidths
Bandwidth multiplied 
by following scales
Note: TOT effect size represents the treatment-on-treated effect size produced by a regression discontinunity instrumental-
variable methodology. The relative growth rate represents the TOT effect size divided by the expected control group outcome. 
Control group represents students near the $4,000 estimated family contribution cutpoint and within the optimized bandwidth. 
Effect size standard errors are clustered by cohort and university enrolled in freshmen year. Year refers to the year post college 
entry. SCH represents semester credit hours. Q4Q1 represents the time span between October to the following March.
P-value thresholds are represented at the following levels: < 0.001 ***, < 0.01 **, <0.05 *, < 0.1 + .
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Figure B5. 
Percent of Initial TEXAS Grant Awardees who Renew Their 
Award in Years Following the First Year of College Entry
Note: Percent is based on the restricted study sample of students who entered college in the fall of 2004 to 2011, 
who have an Estimated Family Contribution between $2,600 and $5,400, and who meet all other TEXAS Grant 
eligibility criteria.
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Figure B6. 
Bachelor’s Degree Graduation Rates by Time to Degree
Note: TOT effect size represents the treatment on the treated effect size produced by a regression discontinuity 
instrumental-variable method. Control group estimates represent expected graduation rates of students who do 
not receive a TEXAS grant. Year refers to the year since college entry. 
P-value indicators represent statistical significance of effect sizes. The p-values thresholds are represented at the 
following levels: < .001 ***, < .01 **, < .05 *, <.1 +. 
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Appendix C 
 
Declines Frequency Percent
0 90 8%
1 82 7%
2 98 8%
3 213 18%
4 318 27%
5 253 22%
6 100 9%
7 19 2%
8 0 0%
9 0 0%
10 0 0%
Total 1173 100%
Table C1. The Frequency of Declines in Dual-Credit 
Participation by School Districts Across Eleven Cohorts 
of High School Students
Note: This study followed eleven cohorts of Texas public 
high school students starting in the year they entered high 
school. The study period was from 2001 to 2011. The 
above table describes the frequency of declines in dual-
credit participation across time by 1173 school districts in 
the study population. Eighty eight school districts 
experienced no declines, while one experienced eight 
declines.
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N Mean SD Min Max
White 12,021        0.57 0.30 0.00 1.00
Hispanic 12,021        0.31 0.29 0.00 1.00
Black 12,021        0.10 0.16 0.00 1.00
Asian 12,021        0.01 0.03 0.00 0.68
Other 12,021        0.01 0.02 0.00 0.34
Immigrant 12,021        0.00 0.01 0.00 0.86
Federal Reduced Lunch Participation 12,021        0.09 0.07 0.00 1.00
Federal Free Lunch Participation 12,021        0.37 0.21 0.00 1.00
Federal Food Assistance Participation 12,021        0.03 0.12 0.00 1.00
Reading 8th grade Z-score 12,021        -0.02 0.38 -4.15 2.55
Math 8th grade Z-score 12,021        -0.07 0.41 -3.80 2.72
Dual Credit Participation 12,021        0.18 0.17 0.00 1.00
AP Participation 12,021        0.48 0.58 0.00 8.14
Avg Math Dual Credit 12,021        0.05 0.11 0.00 1.97
Avg English Dual Credit 12,021        0.15 0.21 0.00 4.00
Avg Science Dual Credit 12,021        0.01 0.05 0.00 1.13
Avg Social Science Dual Credit 12,021        0.22 0.31 0.00 4.06
Avg Foreign Language Dual Credit 12,021        0.01 0.05 0.00 1.25
Avg Health Dual Credit 12,021        0.00 0.03 0.00 1.58
Avg Art Dual Credit 12,021        0.01 0.03 0.00 0.77
Avg Computer Science Dual Credit 12,021        0.00 0.02 0.00 0.81
Avg Other Dual Credit 12,021        0.00 0.01 0.00 0.39
Avg Master's-degreed-instructor Dual Credit 2,212          0.18 0.32 0.00 2.72
Avg Doctoral-degreed-instructor Dual Credit 2,212          0.01 0.05 0.00 1.06
Avg Face-to-face Dual Credit 2,212          0.62 0.80 0.00 6.14
Avg Blended Dual Credit 2,212          0.34 0.69 0.00 11.06
Avg Video Dual Credit 2,212          0.19 0.54 0.00 5.73
Avg Computer-based Dual Credit 2,212          0.00 0.02 0.00 0.64
Avg High-school-located Dual Credit 2,072          0.02 0.16 0.00 3.43
Avg Community-College-located Dual Credit 2,186          0.50 0.93 0.00 7.42
Avg University-located Dual Credit 2,212          0.37 0.77 0.00 11.67
Avg Other-located Dual Credit 2,212          0.28 0.52 0.00 6.60
Table C2. Descriptive Statistics of School Districts, Observantions pooled across 11 cohorts
Note: DC stands for Dual Credit. The drop in observations of variables describing instructors' highest degree 
held, location, and teaching mode represents a data limitation. The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board 
began collecting these variables in 2012.
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DC AP
Baseline 
Estimate
Student Outcomes Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Mean/(SD) Obs ISD's Rho
High School Grad Rate Year 4 0.066 0.123 0.729    12,021      1,173 0.93
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.164)
Univ App Rate Year 5 0.100 0.160 0.260    12,021      1,173 0.90
(0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.195)
Univ Admit Rate Year 5 0.096 0.117 0.221    12,021      1,173 0.89
(0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.210)
Univ Enroll Rate Year 5 0.082 0.079 0.200    12,021      1,173 0.89
(0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.146)
Comm College Enroll Rate Year 5 0.023 0.064 0.309    12,021      1,173 0.90
(0.012)+ (0.011)*** (0.176)
Associates Grad Rate Year 6 0.021 -0.002 0.008    10,916      1,166 0.71
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.049)
Associates Grad Rate Year 8 0.018 0.005 0.033      8,708      1,140 0.81
(0.005)*** (0.004) (0.051)
Bachelor's Grad Rate Year 8 0.051 0.029 0.070      8,708      1,140 0.84
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.055)
Bachelor's Grad Rate Year 10 0.056 0.097 0.155      6,535      1,122 0.88
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.071)
Bachelor's Grad Rate Year 12 0.063 0.115 0.180      4,344      1,115 0.90
(0.014)*** (0.012)*** (0.083)
Graduate Degree Grad Rate Year 12 0.008 0.024 0.022      4,344      1,115 0.71
(0.004)* (0.004)*** (0.021)
Graduate Degree Grad Rate Year 13 0.003 0.029 0.028      3,250      1,107 0.76
(0.004) (0.006)*** (0.022)
Table C3.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
School-District Fixed Effects Regression Results Relating Changes in Dual Credit (DC) and Advanced Placement (AP) 
Participation to Student Outcomes
Note: The above results were produced by a school-district fixed effects regression model using school district-level panel 
data with probability weights that equal a distrist's average student population as a percent of the total average statewide 
population of students. ISD's represents the number of unique school districts. Obs represents total number of pooled 
observations. Standard errors were clustered by school district. Dual credit (DC) and Advanced Placement (AP) represent 
the percent of students earning at least one DC and AP credit per cohort per school district, respectively. Baseline estimates 
represent the average of expected outcomes when participation n dual credit is zero. For all models, the hypothesis that 
coeifficients were jointly equal to zero could be rejected with a p-value less than 0.001. Bolded effects were statistically 
distinct from a majority of the other effect sizes based on a two-tailed t-test and a p-value of less than 0.05.
P-value thresholds were represented at the following levels: < .0001 ***, <.001 **, <.05*, <.1+.
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DC DC X DC AP AP X AP Constant
Student Outcomes Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Obs ISD's Rho
High School Grad Rate Year 4 0.0284 -0.0052 0.0468 -0.0098 0.6865   12,021  1,173 0.93
(0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.013)***
Univ App Rate Year 5 0.0406 -0.0024 0.0474 -0.0049 0.2333   12,021  1,173 0.91
(0.004)*** (0.001)* (0.008)*** (0.002)** (0.015)***
Univ Admit Rate Year 5 0.0383 -0.0023 0.0289 -0.002 0.2216   12,021  1,173 0.90
(0.005)*** (0.001)* (0.008)*** (0.002) (0.015)***
Univ Enroll Rate Year 5 0.0342 -0.0015 0.0281 -0.0042 0.2216   12,021  1,173 0.90
(0.004)*** (0.001)+ (0.005)*** (0.001)** (0.011)***
Comm College Enroll Rate Year 5 0.0022 -0.002 0.025 -0.0053 0.2918   12,021  1,173 0.90
(0.004) (0.001)+ (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.01)***
Associates Grad Rate Year 6 0.0066 0.0041 0.001 -0.0006 0.0063   10,916  1,166 0.72
(0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.000)* (0.003)*
Associates Grad Rate Year 8 0.0049 0.0031 0.0038 -0.0015 0.0249     8,708  1,140 0.81
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)* (0.000)** (0.004)***
Bachelor's Grad Rate Year 8 0.0196 0.0025 0.0108 -0.0009 0.0897     8,708  1,140 0.83
(0.002)*** (0.001)+ (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.005)***
Bachelor's Grad Rate Year 10 0.0268 0.0035 0.0333 -0.0048 0.1765     6,535  1,122 0.88
(0.005)*** (0.003) (0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.008)***
Bachelor's Grad Rate Year 12 0.0364 0.002 0.043 -0.0085 0.1905     4,344  1,115 0.90
(0.007)*** (0.004) (0.007)*** (0.003)** (0.009)***
Graduate Degree Grad Rate Year 12 0.0058 0.0004 0.0111 -0.0019 0.0221     4,344  1,115 0.70
(0.003)* (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)***
Graduate Degree Grad Rate Year 13 0.004 0.0009 0.0131 -0.0025 0.0289     3,250  1,107 0.76
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)*** (0.001)** (0.004)***
Table C4.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
School-District Fixed Effects Regression Results Relating Changes in Average Dual Credit (DC) and Advanced Placement (AP) Credit 
Earned in Quadratic Functional Form to Student Outcomes
Note: ISD's represents the number of unique school districts. Obs represents total number of pooled observations. The above results were 
produced by a school-district fixed effects regression model using school district level panel data with probability weights that equal a 
distrist's average student population as a percent of the average annual total statewide population of students. Standard errors were clustered 
by school district. Dual credit (DC) and Advanced Placement (AP) represent average amounts of DC and AP credit earned per cohort per 
school district, respectively. Baseline estimates represent the average of expected outcomes when participation n dual credit is zero. For all 
models, the hypothesis that coeifficients were jointly equal to zero could be rejected with a p-value less than 0.001. 
P-value thresholds were represented at the following levels: < .0001 ***, <.001 **, <.05*, <.1+.
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Master-
degreed 
Instructor
Doctoral-
degreed 
Instructor
Baseline 
Estimate
Student Outcomes Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Mean/(SD) Obs ISD's Rho
High School Grad Rate Year 4 0.015 0.059 0.794 2,212   1,115   0.95
(0.010) (0.046) (0.08)
Univ App Rate Year 5 0.036 0.053 0.298 2,212   1,115   0.95
(0.012)** (0.095) (0.11)
Univ Admit Rate Year 5 0.039 0.031 0.245 2,212   1,115   0.94
(0.012)** (0.079) (0.10)
Univ Enroll Rate Year 5 0.047 0.033 0.214 2,212   1,115   0.94
(0.010)*** (0.052) (0.09)
Comm College Enroll Rate Year 5 -0.005 0.020 0.316 2,212   1,115   0.92
(0.011) (0.063) (0.09)
Associates Grad Rate Year 6 0.017 0.042 0.010 2,212   1,115   0.87
(0.006)** (0.035) (0.05)
Table C6.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
School-District Fixed Effects Regression Results Relating Changes in Average Dual Credit (DC) and 
Advanced Placement (AP) Earned by  to Student Outcomes
Note: ISD's represents the number of unique school districts. Obs represents total number of pooled 
observations. The above results were produced by a school-district fixed effects regression model using school 
district level panel data with probability weights that equal a distrist's average student population as a percent of 
the average annual total statewide population of students. Standard errors were clustered by school district. 
Master-degreed Instructor and Doctoral-degreed Instrutor represent the average dual credit earned in classes 
instructed by teachers with Master's and doctoral degrees, respectively. Baseline estimates represent the average 
of expected outcomes when participation n dual credit is zero. For all models, the hypothesis that coeifficients 
were jointly equal to zero could be rejected with a p-value less than 0.001. 
P-value thresholds were represented at the following levels: < .0001 ***, <.001 **, <.05*, <.1+.
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Face-to-face
Blended 
Learning Video Computer
Baseline 
Estimate
Student Outcomes Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Mean/(SD) Obs  ISD's Rho
High School Grad Rate Year 4 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.79 2,212   1,115   0.94
(0.006) (0.007)* (0.011)** (0.060)*** (0.16)
Univ App Rate Year 5 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.29 2,212   1,115   0.95
(0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.012)*** (0.092) (0.12)
Univ Admit Rate Year 5 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.24 2,212   1,115   0.94
(0.004)*** (0.009)** (0.011)** (0.083) (0.11)
Univ Enroll Rate Year 5 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.21 2,212   1,115   0.94
(0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.114) (0.11)
Comm College Enroll Rate Year 5 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.32 2,212   1,115   0.92
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.086) (0.15)
Associates Grad Rate Year 6 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 2,212   1,115   0.87
(0.002)*** (0.003)* (0.005) (0.016) (0.06)
Table C7.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
School-District Fixed Effects Regression Results Relating Changes in Average Dual Credit (DC) and Advanced Placement (AP) Earned 
by Instruction Mode to Student Outcomes
Note: ISD's represents the number of unique school districts. Obs represents total number of pooled observations. The above results were 
produced by a school-district fixed effects regression model using school district level panel data with probability weights that equal a 
distrist's average student population as a percent of the average annual total statewide population of students. Standard errors were clustered 
by school district. Master-degreed Instructor and Doctoral-degreed Instrutor represent the average dual credit earned in classes instructed by 
teachers with Master's and doctoral degrees, respectively. Baseline estimates represent the average of expected outcomes when participation n 
dual credit is zero. For all models, the hypothesis that coeifficients were jointly equal to zero could be rejected with a p-value less than 0.001. 
Bolded effects were statistically distinct from a majority of the other effect sizes based on a two-tailed t-test and a p-value of less than 0.05.
P-value thresholds were represented at the following levels: < .0001 ***, <.001 **, <.05*, <.1+.
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University 
Campus
Community 
College 
Campus
High School 
Campus Other Sites
Baseline 
Estimate
Student Outcomes Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Mean/(SD) Obs ISD's Rho
High School Grad Rate Year 4 0.038 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.79 2,068  1,060   0.90
(0.020)+ (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.10)
Univ App Rate Year 5 -0.003 0.011 0.017 0.020 0.30 2,068  1,060   0.95
(0.014) (0.003)** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.09)
Univ Admit Rate Year 5 -0.011 0.008 0.014 0.020 0.25 2,068  1,060   0.94
(0.012) (0.003)** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.08)
Univ Enroll Rate Year 5 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.023 0.21 2,068  1,060   0.93
(0.012) (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.08)
Comm College Enroll Rate Year 5 0.031 -0.009 -0.004 0.001 0.32 2,068  1,060   0.91
(0.022) (0.004)* (0.005) (0.006) (0.11)
Associates Grad Rate Year 6 0.008 0.010 -0.004 0.002 0.01 2,068  1,060   0.89
(0.004)+ (0.002)*** (0.002)* (0.002) (0.04)
Table C8.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
School-District Fixed Effects Regression Results Relating Changes in Average Dual Credit (DC) and Advanced Placement 
(AP) Earned by Instruction Location to Student Outcomes
Note: ISD's represents the number of unique school districts. Obs represents total number of pooled observations. The above 
results were produced by a school-district fixed effects regression model using school district level panel data with probability 
weights that equal a distrist's average student population as a percent of the average annual total statewide population of students. 
Standard errors were clustered by school district. The four dual credit locations represent the average dual credit earned in dual 
credit classes located at a university, community college, high school, and other sites, respectively. Baseline estimates represent the 
average of expected outcomes when participation n dual credit is zero. Bolded effects were statistically distinct from a majority of 
the other effect sizes based on a two-tailed t-test and a p-value of less than 0.05.
P-value thresholds were represented at the following levels: < .0001 ***, <.001 **, <.05*, <.1+.
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Figure C1. Adoption of Dual-Credit Policy by Type of School District
Note: Categories of school districts are defined by the Texas Education Agency. The horizontal axis 
represents the 9th-grade-entering year of each cohort analyzed.
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Figure C2. Student Participation in Dual Credit at Dual-Credit School Districts                                      
by Type of School District
Note: Categories of school districts are defined by the Texas Education Agency. The horizontal axis 
represents the 9th-grade-entering year of each cohort analyzed.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
All Major Urban Major Suburban Non-Metro Rural Other Charter
 128 
 
Figure C3. Change in Student Outcomes by Increasing Levels of Average Credit Earned in Dual 
Credit, CTE Dual Credit, and AP (measured in semester credit hours)
Note: Estimates are derived from a school district fixed effects regression model using school-district level 
panel data. Relationships are graphed if they are statistically significant based on a two-sided t-test with a p-
value of less than 0.05.
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Figure C3 Continued. Change in Student Outcomes by Increasing Levels of Average Credit Earned in 
Dual Credit, CTE Dual Credit, and AP (measured in semester credit hours)
Note: Estimates are derived from a school district fixed effects regression model using school-district level 
panel data. Relationships are graphed if they are statistically significant based on a two-sided t-test with a p-
value of less than 0.05.
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Appendix D 
 
 
 
124,313$                Net benefit to taxpayers of helping one student complete bachelor's degree
x 5% Additional years of work
x 17,096                    Awardees
106,262,552$         Benefit to taxpayers for shortened time to degree
17,096                    Awardees
x 4% Effect on Bachelor's degree completion
684                         Students who earned a bachelor's degree due to receiving a TEXAS grant
x 124,313$                Net benefit to taxpayers of helping one student complete bachelor's degree
85,010,041$           Benefit to taxpayers for increased educational attainment rate
17,096                    Initial TEXAS grant awards
+ 20,720 Renewd TEXAS grant awards
37,816 Total awards
x (6,938)$                  Average TEXAS grant cost per award
(262,369,850)$       Cost of TEXAS grants
5,512$                    Average decline in student debt
x 17,096 Awardees
94,233,152$           Benefit to students of reduced student debt
865,183$                Marginal increase in lifetime earnings of helping one college student complete bachelor's degree
x 5% Additional years of work
43,259$                  Increase in earnings from shortening time to bachelor's degree
x 17,096 Awardees
739,558,428$         Benefit of shortening time to bachelor's degree
17,096                    Awardees
x 4% Effect on Bachelor's degree completion
684                         Students who earned a bachelor's degree due to receiving a TEXAS grant
865,183$                Marginal increase in lifetime earnings of helping one college student complete bachelor's degree
591,646,743$         Benefit for increased educational attainment rate
576,789$                Marginal increase in lifetime earnings from helping one college graduate earn a graduate degree
x 5% TEXAS grant effect on graduate degree completion
x 17,096 Awardees
x 593,885$                Benefit from increased graduate degree holders
1,354,934,951$      Net Economic Benefit
Table D1. Back-of-the-envelope Calculation of Net Economic Impact of TEXAS Grants
Note: This calculation assumes the marginal increase in lifetime earnings of helping an average college student complete a bachelor's degree is 
$865,183, the marginal increase in lifetime earnings of moving an average student from bachelor’s degree-only to earning a graduate degree 
is $576,789, the net impact to taxpayers of helping an average college student earn a bachelor's degree is $124,313, the TEXAS grant effect 
on bachelor's degree completion rates is 4 percent, the TEXAS grant effect on time to bachelor’s degree is a decrease of two years, the 
TEXAS grant effect on student debt is $5,512, the TEXAS grant effect on graduate degree completion is 5 percent, and the average cost of a 
TEXAS grant award for one year is $6,938.  All figures are in 2016 current dollars.
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